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Climate Change and Natural Gas 
Dynamic Governance 
Elizabeth Burleson † 
“Every year, billions of dollars worth of natural gas are wasted; 
burned or flared at oil fields across the world. Such flaring 
produces some 400 million tons of greenhouse gas emissions.”  
—World Bank* 
Abstract 
Hydraulic fracturing has been a game changer for the energy field, 
bringing to mind the “nothing in excess” carving at Delphi. Whether 
heeding ancient oracles or cutting-edge principles of calibration, I argue 
that dynamic governance innovation can facilitate climate-energy-water 
balancing to address natural gas governance gaps. Methane lost to the 
atmosphere not only disrupts the climate at a rate over twenty times 
that of carbon dioxide,1 but it also constitutes a loss of revenue. Low 
natural gas prices and distance to markets have been the key drivers of 
flaring, absent a price on carbon dioxide, methane, and other climate 
destabilizers. Methane is the primary component—typically 70 to 90 
percent—of natural gas.2 Reducing methane emissions through 
governance innovation presents a profitable way of enhancing economic, 
social, and environmental synergies. 
 
† Professor Elizabeth Burleson obtained her LL.M. from the London 
School of Economics and J.D. from the University of Connecticut School 
of Law and teaches energy law at Pace Law School and has served as an 
International Panel on Climate Change reviewer.  
*  Global Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership, World Bank, http://web. 
worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTOGMC/EXTGGFR
/0,,menuPK:578075~pagePK:64168427~piPK:64168435~theSitePK:578069,0
0.html (last updated Dec. 13, 2012) (“GGFR supports the efforts of oil 
producing countries and companies to increase the use of associated 
natural gas and thus reduce flaring and venting, which wastes valuable 
resources and damages the environment.”); see also Massachusetts v. 
EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007) (determining that states have standing 
to bring suit against the EPA to force it to regulate greenhouse gas 
pollutants). 
1. EPA, Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 
1990–2010, at ES-9 (2012); see also Greenhouse Gas Equivalencies 
Calculator, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/energy-resources/calc 
ulator.html (last updated Mar. 13, 2013) (allowing for easy equivalency 
calculations between different types of greenhouse gases). 
2. See Background, NaturalGas.org, http://www.naturalgas.org/overview 
/background.asp (last visited Mar. 15, 2013).  
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Introduction 
Venting and flaring natural gas flies in the face of efforts to address 
climate change.3 Yet, the hydraulic fracturing debate remains charac-
terized by an underlying sustainability tension among economic, social, 
and environmental integrity rather than a coordinated effort to find 
dynamic governance synergies. Rising natural gas leakage is a problem 
looking for a governance handle. The problem is becoming widespread, 
and existing regulation is inconsistent. Natural gas valued at $50 billion 
by the World Bank is flared annually, contributing around 400 million 
tons of CO2 equivalent to climate change,4 an amount equal to the  
3. Dean Scott, World Bank Sees Increase in Flared Gas Undermining 
Global Progress on Emissions, Bloomberg BNA (July 6, 2012), 
http://news.bna.com/erln/ERLNWB/split_display.adp?fedfid=27270929&
vname=ernotallissues&jd=a0d3k1v5e0&split=0 (“Russia remains the 
leading gas flaring nation, accounting for 37.4 bcm of flaring in 2011, 
followed by Nigeria (14.6 bcm); Iran (11.4 bcm); Iraq (9.4 bcm); and the 
United States (7.1 bcm), according to the data, culled from satellite data 
collected by the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra-
tion. . . . In 2011, the United States had the largest one-year increase of any 
country of 2.5 billion cubic meters from 2010 levels, a 54 percent increase. 
That was largely due to increased natural gas drilling in the United States, 
much of it from greater use of hydraulic fracturing or fracking.”). A stable 
climate is a public good, the absence of which will thwart the provision of 
other public goods such as access to fresh water. The Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) indicates that “[c]hanges in precipitation 
patterns and the disappearance of glaciers are projected to significantly 
affect water availability for human consumption, agriculture and energy 
generation.” Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 
Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report 50 (2007). 
4. Roger Harrabin, Gas Flaring Target of London Conference, BBC News 
(Oct. 24, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-2005 
5041 (highlighting a London flaring conference of the Global Gas Flaring 
Reduction partnership that has helped Russia cut flaring by 40 percent 
and Nigeria by 29 percent); see also Key Achievements of GGFR Partners 
and the Way Forward, Global Gas Flaring Reduction, http:// 
www.flaringreductionforum.org/agenda.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) 
(providing conference schedule and access to presentations). 
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average annual energy consumption of Italy.5 Innovative governance 
coordination can help reduce this waste by increasing the amount of 
gas sold to market, injected back underground, or used to power 
operations, and it can also increase local communities’ access to energy. 
Recontextualizing the fracking debate, this Article addresses 
unconventional natural gas from the underexplored contexts of energy 
systems analysis and social movement analysis. It seeks to highlight 
multi-problem-solving approaches that can transcend problem shifting 
to identify and implement broad energy-climate-water solutions. It 
does so through a public participation frame that can contribute to 
local, state, national, and global cooperation to expand energy 
availability and protect climate as a public commons. 
Part I will provide an overview of the elements that make up the 
climate challenge to implement mitigation momentum. It will sketch 
the contours of the governance gap globally and in the United States, 
where oil and gas systems released nearly 40 percent of U.S. methane 
emissions.6 While it may be challenging to monitor 1.5 million miles of 
natural gas pipelines throughout the United States, it is not only 
possible but also profitable to stop venting and flaring natural gas.7  
Part II will suggest dynamic governance innovations that may be 
able to help diffuse natural gas political pressure. It will consider where 
federal coordination can interstitially work with local, state, and non-
state-actor stakeholders. It will analyze how unconventional natural gas 
emissions of the potent greenhouse gas methane can be reduced 
through a combination of monitoring, technology-forcing measures that 
incentivize green technologies, and market-flexibility measures, such as 
cap and trade, which can help share aggregate information and 
 
5. John Vidal, World Bank Urges Nations to End ‘Wasteful’ Gas Flaring, 
The Guardian (Oct. 24, 2012, 12:40 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
environment/2012/oct/24/world-bank-gas-flaring; see also Mark Clayton, 
US Wastes More Natural Gas than Ever as Fracking Byproduct, Alaska 
Dispatch (July 16, 2012), http://www.alaskadispatch.com/article/us-
wastes-more-natural-gas-ever-fracking-byproduct (“About 5 trillion cubic 
feet of natural gas were flared or vented without burning worldwide last 
year. That huge amount of wasted energy is roughly equal to a quarter of 
all natural gas consumed in the US annually, the World Bank reports. 
Flaring also dumped 360 million tons of greenhouse gases into the 
atmosphere over the same period, equal to the exhaust of 70 million cars.”). 
Russia, Nigeria, Iran, Iraq, and the United States release the highest 
greenhouse gas emissions via flaring. Estimated Flared Volumes from 
Satellite Data, 2007–2011, World Bank, http://web.worldbank.org/ 
WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTOGMC/EXTGGFR/0,,contentMD
K:22137498~menuPK:3077311~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSiteP
K:578069,00.html (last updated June 14, 2012). 
6. EPA, Overview of Final Amendments to Air Regulations for the 
Oil and Natural Gas Industry: Fact Sheet, at 2 (2012), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/airquality/oilandgas/pdfs/20120417fs.pdf. 
7. Id. at 3. 
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implement cost-effective green technologies that genuinely mitigate 
climate change. Part II will also offer recommendations for effective 
climate mitigation and enhanced energy access through innovation. 
This Article concludes that inclusive decision making can help 
energy sites increase energy access and prioritize public health and 
environmental integrity as well as profit. 
I base this Article upon the premise that social movement 
identities and objectives vary with context and access to information. 
Furthermore, I rest my topology on the premise that inclusive, 
dynamic decision making can reduce definitional uncertainty 
regarding what constitutes environmentally sound technology that 
expands energy access and addresses climate change.  
Based upon the above premises, I map a topology of dynamic 
governance that can address the climate impacts of natural gas 
emissions through technical and public-private innovative coordination. 
In designing this theory, I rely on the following assumptions. First, I 
assume that flaring will continue in the context of expanding 
unconventional natural gas production.8 Second, I assume that the 
private sector needs a social license to operate, irrespective of existing 
legal exemptions for unconventional natural gas extraction, and that 
there are many data points on a spectrum between social prohibition 
and full acceptance. In the middle realm of acquiescence, shared 
understandings can lead to economic, social, and environmental 
synergies. This cannot be genuinely accomplished through glossing over 
deeply held beliefs—be they economic, social, or environmental. 
Ecological and health thresholds are public goods on par with economic 
growth. Bonds that designate clean up funds to specified escrow 
accounts cannot redress the array of legal challenges facing cradle-to-
grave unconventional gas development. Broader dynamic trans-
boundary climate-energy-water cooperation can help fill key governance 
gaps. Low natural gas prices and distance to markets have been the key 
drivers of flaring, absent incentives to recognize the costs of greenhouse 
gas emissions and internalize these costs. Coordinating efforts to gather 
and share emissions information is a key element in recognizing the 
price of methane, carbon dioxide, and other greenhouse gases.  
Dynamic governance can help increase methane leakage reporting 
in particular and greenhouse emission reductions generally. This Article 
argues that addressing energy and climate in an integrate manner 
should involve coordinated state and non-state initiatives to measure 
and reduce energy sector greenhouse gases. It does so with a particular 
emphasis on recent unconventional natural gas developments within the 
larger challenge to respond effectively to climate change.  
 
8. See Interview by Spencer Mazyck, Bloomberg Law Legal Analyst, with 
author (June 21, 2011), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
-UrDuU0UBRo (discussing risks and benefits of hydraulic fracturing). 
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I. Sketching the Contours of the Governance Gap 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) has yet to be fleshed out into an implementation plan that 
can effectively address climate destabilization. With near-universal 
ratification of the framework climate convention, countries around the 
world committed to the precautionary principle of not letting 
uncertainty stand in the way of addressing climate change.9 For the 
purposes of this Article, the following UNFCCC definitions will be 
foundational: 
1. “Adverse effects of climate change” means changes in the 
physical environment or biota resulting from climate change 
which have significant deleterious effects on the composition, 
resilience or productivity of natural and managed ecosystems or 
on the operation of socio-economic systems or on human health 
and welfare. 
2. “Climate change” means a change of climate which is 
attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters 
the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in 
addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable 
time periods.10 
The task at hand is to overcome a complex collective action 
problem and start incentivizing environmentally sound innovation. 
Not everyone shares the same definition of environmentally sound 
technology or governance, yet finding shared understandings can help 
advance climate-energy-water coordination. 
 
9. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 3(3), May 
9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC] (“The Parties should 
take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes 
of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects. Where there are threats 
of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not 
be used as a reason for postponing such measures, taking into account 
that policies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost-
effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost. To 
achieve this, such policies and measures should take into account different 
socio-economic contexts, be comprehensive, cover all relevant sources, 
sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases and adaptation, and comprise all 
economic sectors. Efforts to address climate change may be carried out 
cooperatively by interested Parties.”). The convention entered into force 
on March 21, 1994, and today 195 countries are parties to the convention. 
See also Elizabeth Burleson, Climate Change Consensus: Emerging 
International Law, 34 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 543 
(2010) (analyzing the growing international consensus on the need for 
adaptation to avoid catastrophic climate change). 
10. UNFCCC, supra note 9, art. 1(1)–(2). 
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This brings us to the polarized hydrofracking debate. Hydraulic 
fracturing involves injecting millions of gallons of water, sand, and 
chemicals underground to fracture rocks, allowing oil and natural gas 
to flow back to the surface.11 Combined with new horizontal drilling 
methods, hydraulic fracturing poses challenges to balancing economic, 
social, and environmental priorities.12 This challenge is exacerbated by 
very low natural gas prices, due to warmer winters lowering demand 
and unconventional natural gas development causing a supply glut.13 
Cracked well casings and abandoned wells pose particular risks for 
reducing natural gas air and water emissions.14 One particularly 
 
11. See Hannah Wiseman, Untested Waters: The Rise of Hydraulic 
Fracturing in Oil and Gas Production and the Need to Revisit 
Regulation, 20 Fordham Envtl. L. Rev. 115, 117–19 (2009) (describing 
the process in greater detail). Natural gas development impacts include: 
air emissions; reduced water availability and quality; industrial land use in 
close proximity to homes; and wastewater storage, treatment, and 
disposal challenges. Hydrofracking has come to mean different natural gas 
activities to different stakeholders. To natural gas operators, it refers to a 
very specific part of the natural gas production process, while the media 
have taken a wider interpretation encompassing the lifecycle of natural 
gas extraction. 
12. See Mika Gröndahl, Bill Marsh & Graham Roberts, Chemicals and Toxic 
Materials That Come With Hydrofracking: Waste Disposal and Other 
Hazards in Drilling for Natural Gas, N.Y. Times (Mar. 1, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/03/01/us/chemicals-and-toxic-
materials-in-hydrofracking.html (depicting unconventional natural gas 
development water risks); see also U.S. Dept. of Energy, Shale Gas 
Production Subcommittee, Second Ninety Day Report (2011) 
(discussing the Department of Energy’s recommendations for improving 
the safety and reducing the impacts of fracking); Rebecca Hammer & 
Jeanne VanBriesen, NRDC, In Fracking’s Wake: New Rules are 
Needed to Protect Our Health and Environment from 
Contaminated Wastewater (2012), (pushing for stronger safeguards 
against fracking contamination at the state and federal levels). 
13. Dan Strumpf & Ryan Dezember, Natural Gas Falls To Two-Year Low, 
Wall St. J., Dec. 31, 2011, at B1 (internal citations omitted) (“U.S. 
natural gas prices fell to their lowest point in more than two years, 
underscoring how the nation’s booming energy business is becoming a 
victim of its own success. Prices for the commodity have been under 
pressure over the last couple of years, as new drilling techniques 
unlocked vast new stores of natural gas from shale formations and other 
so-called unconventional reservoirs. . . . [U]nusually mild temperatures 
across much of the U.S. have damped demand for gas to heat homes 
and offices. . . . ‘The sub-$3 levels for gas prices in the winter really 
point to the incredible amount of nonconventional gas that has come 
onto the market the last two years,’ . . . .”). 
14. See Joseph L. Sax, Reserved Public Rights In Water, 36 Vt. L. Rev. 535 
(2012) (noting the underdevelopment of U.S. water law in regions outside 
the American West); A. Dan Tarlock, Takings, Water Rights, and 
Climate Change, 36 Vt. L. Rev. 731, 733–34 (2012) (“However 
imperative it may be to roll back greenhouse-gas emission levels, 
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problematic question is how to go about capping abandoned wells—a 
task complicated by underground fires and lack of records as to where 
mines were drilled.15 Plugging abandoned mines is technically possible 
but expensive and hampered by this lack of records.16 
The national debate over gas development in the United States is 
characterized by a dearth of information and lack of consensus over 
its environmental, economic, and social implications. Resources for the 
Future’s “Pathways to Dialogue” work has involved survey-based 
statistical analysis of experts in government, industry, universities, 
and nongovernmental organizations to map risk pathways.17 Finding 
shared understandings has been complicated by lack of information. 
Uncertainties impact the entire picture—geology, well types, 
horizontal drilling, fracturing fluids, fracture monitoring methods, 
watershed dynamics, airshed dynamics, socio-economic dynamics, 
research methods and funding, seismicity triggers, health thresholds, 
ecosystem service impacts, and public choice or public participation 
framing of the scope of public interest.   
mitigation is largely an illusion in an era of constrained budgets, an 
increasingly dysfunctional American political system, the weakness of 
international environmental law, and the resistance of large segments of 
the energy industry to switching to a non-carbon-based future. The 
United States may try a few token gestures, such as carbon sequestration, 
and throw money at alternative energy research, but the status quo of 
continued reliance on hydrocarbon energy with the resulting greenhouse-
gas emissions seems the norm for the foreseeable future.”); see also 
Opinion, The Facts About Fracking, Wall St. J., June 25, 2011, at A14 
(“The Duke study did spotlight a long-known and more legitimate 
concern: the possibility of leaky well casings at the top of a drilling site, 
from which methane might migrate to water supplies. As the BP Gulf of 
Mexico spill attests, proper well construction and maintenance are major 
issues in any type of drilling, and they ought to be the focus of industry 
standards and attention.”). 
15. See Pennsylvania’s Burning Mines: Fire in the Hole, Economist, Mar. 
14, 2009, at 34 (“Evacuating people has proved cheaper than trying to 
put the fires out. The intricate subterranean network of tunnels and 
anthracite veins makes extinguishing them both expensive and uncertain 
to succeed . . . .”). 
16. Scientists are unsure of what to do about underground mine fires. See id. 
(“Red Ash is the oldest of 36 fires currently blazing in Pennsylvania’s 
180,000 acres (73,000 hectares) of abandoned mines. The most famous is 
beneath Centralia, which began in 1962 when residents burned some 
rubbish on top of an exposed coal seam. In 1981 a hole there swallowed 
an [sic] 12-year-old boy; Pennsylvania has since condemned the entire 
town, relocated almost all its residents and had its postal code revoked. 
Like Red Ash, Centralia’s fire is thought to have enough fuel to burn for 
many more decades.)  
17. Alan Krupnick, Hal Gordon & Sheila Olmstead, Resources 
for the Future, Pathways to Dialogue: What the Experts Say 
about the Environmental Risks of Shale Gas Development 2–3 
(2013). 
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The slow emergence of information into the public domain has 
focused the hydrofracking debate on the narrow frame of hydraulic 
fracturing fluid and wastewater,18 to the exclusion of the equally 
important need to understand how to minimize methane’s role in 
climate destabilization. Natural gas is largely methane (CH4), 
presenting the challenge and benefit that the product is also the 
pollutant.19 Capturing methane emissions provides a direct revenue 
stream and reduces a powerful greenhouse gas from exacerbating 
climate change. Natural gas is emerging as a strategic global 
commodity. Ice-class liquefied natural gas (LNG) tankers are now able 
to ship natural gas via ice-free summer Arctic Ocean routes to energy-
compromised Japan. While countries such as France have banned 
hydraulic fracturing,20 the U.S. unconventional natural gas boom has 
impacted the global gas marketplace, sending prices downward. 
Inexpensive gas is displacing coal in Canada and the United States. 
This displaced North American coal in turn is displacing costly 
Russian and Norwegian natural gas.21  
 
18. See, e.g., Office of Research & Dev., EPA, Study Of The 
Potential Impacts Of Hydraulic Fracturing On Drinking 
Water Resources: Progress Report, at 1 (2012) (“In response to 
public concern, the US House of Representatives requested that the US 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) conduct scientific research to 
examine the relationship between hydraulic fracturing and drinking water 
resources. In 2011, the EPA began research under its Plan to Study the 
Potential Impacts of Hydraulic Fracturing on Drinking Water Resources. 
The purpose of the study is to assess the potential impacts of hydraulic 
fracturing on drinking water resources, if any, and to identify the driving 
factors that may affect the severity and frequency of such impacts. Scien-
tists are focusing primarily on hydraulic fracturing of shale formations to 
extract natural gas, with some study of other oil- and gas-producing 
formations, including tight sands, and coalbeds. The EPA has designed 
the scope of the research around five stages of the hydraulic fracturing 
water cycle.” (citation omitted)); see also About Us, FracFocus 
Chemical Disposal Registry, http://fracfocus.org/welcome (last 
visited Mar. 15, 2013) (offering limited access to chemicals in hydraulic 
fracturing fluid by well).  
19. See Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks, 
supra note 1, at ES-5 to ES-6. 
20. See Stephen Gardner, European Commission Opens Consultation on 
Hydraulic Fracturing in European Union, Bloomberg BNA (Jan. 2, 2013), 
http://news.bna.com/ieln/IELNWB/split_display.adp?fedfid=28924407&
vname=inernotallissues&jd=a0d5u9k1r9&split=0. Bulgaria and the 
Czech Republic have placed moratoriums on hydraulic fracturing as well, 
while Poland and the United Kingdom have permitted limited exploratory 
operations. Id. 
21. See Eric Yep, Gas Tanker Takes Shortcut to Asia, Wall St. J., Dec. 3, 
2012, at C3 (“Lower European gas prices have implications for Russia’s 
plan to sell gas via a pipeline to China. Russia has argued for a price 
based on European levels, something China has rejected.”). 
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Given the increasingly global nature of natural gas development, 
dynamic governance networking can help identify and share best 
practices to minimize methane emissions. To this end, the World 
Bank Global Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership, launched at the 
2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development, has helped (1) 
coordinate flaring reduction, (2) increase access to natural gas 
markets and (3) increase energy access through local, small-scale gas 
utilization.22 From 2005 to 2010, this coordination helped reduce 
flaring of natural gas “by 22% from 172 billion cubic meters (bcm) to 
134 bcm, according to satellite estimates . . . . The 13-bcm decline in 
2010 is roughly equivalent to 30 million tons of CO2 emissions, or to 
taking almost six million cars off the road.”23 Expanding energy access 
while minimizing wasted natural gas can help change the volatile 
dynamic of sabotaged pipelines into a shared understanding that the 
energy sector requires a social license to operate effectively.  
II. Climate Governance Follow-through 
Governance involves following through on commitments. Under 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the 
object and purpose of a treaty when: (a) it has signed the treaty 
or has exchanged instruments constituting the treaty subject to 
ratification, acceptance or approval, until it shall have made its 
intention clear not to become a party to the treaty . . . .24 
Subsidizing fossil fuel to the exclusion of renewable energy and 
efficiency incentives arguably conflicts with the objective of the 
UNFCCC “to achieve . . . stabilization of greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”25 
 
22. About GGFR, World Bank, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/E 
XTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTOGMC/EXTGGFR/0,,contentMDK:2102
2944~menuPK:828161~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK
:578069,00.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2013).  
23. GGFR, Gas Flaring Down for Fifth Consecutive Year, The News 
Flare, Mar.–Oct. 2011, at 1. 
24. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 18, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S 331; see also id. art. 31, ¶ 3 (“A treaty shall be interpreted in 
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms in their context and in light of its object and purpose.”); Karl 
Zemanek, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (2009) 
(summarizing the key provisions of the Vienna Convention and its 
subsequent impact on later developments). 
25. UNFCCC, supra note 9, art. 2 (“The ultimate objective of this 
Convention and any related legal instruments that the Conference of the 
Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant 
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UNFCCC commitments include reporting and mitigating greenhouse 
gas emissions.26 Furthermore, the treaty binds countries to engage in 
inclusive and cooperative scientific, technological, and socio-economic 
innovation.27 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) country fossil fuel subsidies ranged from $55 to $90 billion 
annually from 2005 to 2011—two-thirds of which went to petroleum 
 
provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concen-
trations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be 
achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt 
naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not 
threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a 
sustainable manner.”). 
26. Id. art. 4 (“(a) Develop, periodically update, publish and make available 
to the Conference of the Parties, in accordance with Article 12, national 
inventories of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks 
of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, using 
comparable methodologies to be agreed upon by the Conference of the 
Parties; (b) Formulate, implement, publish and regularly update national 
and, where appropriate, regional programmes containing measures to 
mitigate climate change by addressing anthropogenic emissions by sources 
and removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the 
Montreal Protocol, and measures to facilitate adequate adaptation to 
climate change; (c) Promote and cooperate in the development, 
application and diffusion, including transfer, of technologies, practices and 
processes that control, reduce or prevent anthropogenic emissions of 
greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol in all relevant 
sectors, including the energy, transport, industry, agriculture, forestry and 
waste management sectors; . . . (f) Take climate change considerations 
into account, to the extent feasible, in their relevant social, economic and 
environmental policies and actions, and employ appropriate methods, for 
example impact assessments, formulated and determined nationally, with 
a view to minimizing adverse effects on the economy, on public health and 
on the quality of the environment, of projects or measures undertaken by 
them to mitigate or adapt to climate change . . . .”). 
27. Id. (“(g) Promote and cooperate in scientific, technological, technical, 
socio-economic and other research, systematic observation and 
development of data archives related to the climate system and intended 
to further the understanding and to reduce or eliminate the remaining 
uncertainties regarding the causes, effects, magnitude and timing of 
climate change and the economic and social consequences of various 
response strategies; (h) Promote and cooperate in the full, open and 
prompt exchange of relevant scientific, technological, technical, socio-
economic and legal information related to the climate system and 
climate change, and to the economic and social consequences of various 
response strategies; (i) Promote and cooperate in education, training 
and public awareness related to climate change and encourage the 
widest participation in this process, including that of non-governmental 
organizations . . . .”). 
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and the remainder to coal and natural gas.28 OECD fossil-fuel subsidy 
reform recommendations include: (1) increasing transparency of data, 
(2) engaging in targeted and transparent economic restructuring and 
poverty alleviation measures, (3) embedding fossil-fuel subsidy 
reforms within wider structural reforms, and (4) sustaining public 
trust that fossil-fuel subsidies are declining through open and inclusive 
communication and coordination among layers of government and 
non-state actors.29 
The United States has substantially facilitated natural gas 
development, most recently committing roughly $29 million to 
optimize methane hydrate extraction from the Arctic.30 Commer-
cialization of frozen methane, which looks like ice but can burn like 
other fossil fuels, is constrained by difficulties in bringing such a 
remote resource to distant markets, yet it has benefited from U.S. 
Department of Energy and industry coordination—the kind of large-
scale coordination needed for broad diffusion of renewable power. 
When the U.S. Energy Information Administration projects that 
renewables growth will only rise from 13 to 16 percent from 2011 to 
2040, and many other entities embed these Energy Information 
 
28. Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Inventory of Estimated 
Budgetary Support and Tax Expenditures for Fossil Fuels 
2013, at 38 (2012); see also Rick Mitchell, U.S. Lags on Using Energy 
Taxes to Achieve Environmental Goals, OECD Data Show, Bloomberg 
BNA, (Feb. 13, 2013), http://news.bna.com/ieln/IELNWB/split_display. 
adp?fedfid=29590928&vname=inernotallissues&jd=a0d6g4y2u9&split=0 
(“The United States generally does not use federal energy taxes as an 
environmental policy tool and ranks near the bottom of OECD’s 34 
member countries in terms of effective national energy tax rates on 
carbon dioxide emissions . . . . The highest overall effective carbon tax 
rates tend to be in European countries, where energy tax policy is 
significantly shaped by the 2003 EU Energy Taxation Directive 
(2003/96/EC), which set minimum tax rates for a variety of energy 
commodities . . . .”). 
29. Mitchell, supra note 28. 
30. News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Energy Department Advances 
Research on Methane Hydrates—The World’s Largest Untapped Fossil 
Energy Resource (Aug. 31, 2012) (“[S]ignificant research remains to (1) 
analyze the role of gas hydrates in the natural environment (2) 
demonstrate that gas hydrates can be produced commercially in an 
environmentally responsible manner and, (3) further assess resource 
volumes, particularly in deepwater settings. These new projects, managed 
by the Energy Department’s National Energy Technology Laboratory, will 
focus research on field programs for deepwater hydrate characterization, 
the response of methane hydrate systems to changing climates, and 
advances in the understanding of gas-hydrate-bearing deposits.”); see also 
U.S. Taps Supply of Frozen Methane, L.A. Times, Nov. 23, 2012, at B3 
(discussing a U.S. Department of Energy study of “methane hydrate, 
which looks like ice but burns like a candle if a match warms its 
molecules”). 
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Administration projections in their own analyses, then path 
dependency may inhibit climate mitigation momentum.31  
Global clean energy investment fell 11 percent in 2012 due to 
regulatory uncertainty, while U.S. clean energy investment crashed 32 
percent due to uncertainty over energy incentives as well as 
competition from natural gas.32 To my mind, climate-energy-water 
governance innovation requires sustained public support for renewable 
and efficiency measures that is at least as substantial as that for 
public-private fossil fuel collaboration.  
Paradigm shifts require moving away from existing assumptions 
toward breakout solutions. Instead, we have fixated on natural gas as 
though it were a silver bullet solution. Frankly, if the comparison 
point is removing the tops of mountains, then most energy sources 
can trump coal on ecosystem integrity grounds.33 To my mind, the 
 
31. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Annual Energy Outlook 2013: Early 
Release Overview 2 (2012) (“To provide a basis against which 
alternative cases and policies can be compared, the AEO2013 Reference 
case generally assumes that current laws and regulations affecting the 
energy sector remain unchanged throughout the projection (including the 
implication that laws that include sunset dates do, in fact, end at the time 
of those sunset dates). This assumption helps increase the comparability 
of the Reference case with other analyses, clarifies the relationship of the 
Reference case to other AEO2013 cases, and enables policy analysis with 
less uncertainty regarding unstated legal or regulatory assumptions.”); see 
also Henry D. Jacoby, Francis M. O’Sullivan & Sergey Paltsev, The 
Influence of Shale Gas on U.S. Energy and Environmental Policy, 1 
Econ. of Energy & Envtl. Pol’y 37, 38, 50 (2012) (finding that 
United States natural gas production may stunt the direction and 
intensity of renewable energy “by up to two decades” and will not 
“provide a ‘bridge’” to a sound energy policy if it “erode[s] efforts to 
prepare a landing at the other end of the bridge”). 
32. Ari Natter, Clean Energy Investment Falls 11 Percent In 2012, Bloomberg 
New Energy Finance Says, Bloomberg BNA (Jan. 15, 2013), http:// 
news.bna.com/deln/DELNWB/split_display.adp?fedfid=29091737&vnam
e=dennotallissues&jd=a0d5z5b4f8&split=0. 
33. International and national regulations are driving reduced coal use. See 
ClimateWire & Robert S. Eshelman, Curbing Coal Mine Methane Could 
Cool Global Warming: Capturing or Burning the Methane Escaping 
from Coal Mines Around the World Would Help Slow Climate Change—
and Improve Safety, Sci. Am. (Sept. 7, 2012), http://www.sci 
entificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=curbing-coal-mine-methane-could-cool-
global-warming (“[W]hen those lumps of fuel are pulled from deep below 
the surface in northern China or exposed by a blast of dynamite on an 
Appalachian mountaintop, invisible plumes of methane gas seep out, as 
well.”). The horizontal hydraulic fracturing revolution also involves coal 
bed methane. See Christopher Martin, Coal Greens Love Buoyed by Shale 
Gas Hydraulic Fracking, Bloomberg News (Aug. 29, 2012, 5:29 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-28/coal-greens-love-buoyed-b 
y-shale-gas-hydrualic-fracking.html (“Development of coal gas is pro-
ceeding faster in places where natural gas is expensive and coal seams 
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metric should be shifted from coal to a comparison between natural 
gas and renewable energy. Further, cap and trade linking should 
involve methane mitigation options where feasible. 
The Energy Information Administration recognizes that “different 
assumptions can affect projections of domestic production, prices, and 
consumption.”34 Similarly, Professor J.B. Ruhl explores the law and 
psychology dimensions of decision making under uncertainty.35 
Whether taking the Energy Information Administration’s economic 
frame, Ruhl’s psychological frame, or a hybrid sustainability frame, it 
remains difficult to retain a comprehensive focus. Ruhl identifies a 
valuable partial truth: the participation of self-perceived climate 
winners is integral to coordinated climate stabilization. Yet I argue 
that it is difficult to assess climate preferences where insufficient 
 
are deep, including Canada, South Africa, New Zealand, China and 
Uzbekistan.”). 
34. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Projected Natural Gas Prices Depend on Shale 
Gas Resource Economics, Today in Energy (Aug. 27, 2012), 
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=7710 (“Considerable 
uncertainty exists regarding the size of the economically recoverable U.S. 
shale gas resource base and the cost of producing those resources. Across 
four shale gas resource scenarios from the Annual Energy Outlook 2012 
(AEO2012), natural gas prices vary by about $4 per million British 
thermal units (MMBtu) in 2035, demonstrating the significant impact 
that shale gas resource uncertainty has in determining future natural gas 
prices. This uncertainty exists primarily because shale gas wells exhibit a 
wide variation in their initial production rate, rate of decline, and 
estimated ultimate recovery per well (or EUR, which is the expected 
cumulative production over the life of a well).”); see also News Release, 
U.S. Geological Survey, USGS Releases New Assessment of Gas Resources 
in the Marcellus Shale, Appalachian Basin (Aug. 23, 2011), available at 
http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID=2893&from=rss_home 
(“The Marcellus Shale contains about 84 trillion cubic feet of 
undiscovered, technically recoverable natural gas and 3.4 billion barrels of 
undiscovered, technically recoverable natural gas liquids according to a 
new assessment by the U. S. Geological Survey (USGS).”); Ian Urbina, 
Geologists Sharply Cut Estimate of Shale Gas, N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 
2011, at A16 (“This is drastically lower than the 410 trillion cubic feet 
that was published earlier this year by the federal Energy Information 
Administration.”); News Release, U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Review of 
Emerging Resources: U.S. Shale Gas And Shale Oil Plays (July 8, 2011), 
available at http://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/usshalegas (projecting 
available shale resources for plays across the U.S.). 
35. See J.B. Ruhl, A Summary of Present and Future Climate Adaptation 
Law, in Global Climate Change and U.S. Law (Michael Gerrard & 
Jody Freeman eds., 2d ed. forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 4–5), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2214001 (“[S]ome of the effects of 
climate change will present entirely new types of challenges for which 
there are no conventional models and methods of adaptation to 
adjust. . . . While these are not unimaginable events, it is not as if we 
have ready-made templates for now to manage them—they are the ‘no-
analog’ phenomena of our climate change future.”). 
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information has been made available. For instance, there are distinct 
notions of public health and individual health, but they are 
interrelated, and acting upon ongoing enhanced information can lead 
to greater health at both levels. The aggregate is often more than the 
sum of its parts when dealing with societies rather than numbers in 
isolation. A thousand people in a village or a university class are not 
equivalent to a randomly selected thousand people chosen from 
around the world. Social fabric is stronger than individual threads. 
The question as to whether someone or some group of people 
would rather ride horses or drive cars depends on some familiarity 
with cars and horses. Knowing how one feels at sixty degrees versus 
eighty degrees does not mean that one can assess the complex 
feedback loops of climate-energy-water dynamics. It is unclear 
whether people would rather be thirsty or struggle with floods. 
Playing a mountainous island dweller who can withstand broader 
climate shocks is not, to my mind, climate winning so much as short-
term or medium-term resilience. Increasingly, climate winners and 
losers will not be able to be isolated from one another. Perhaps this 
resilience is bought through self-interested isolation and a disregard 
for social ties and society safety nets. Perhaps it is sheer luck. As 
bullets are added to the barrel, however, climate roulette becomes 
more and more of a lose-lose proposition. Ruhl’s key caveat is the 
notion of perceived winning, and here perception can be profoundly 
impacted by straightforward information. The core of my argument is 
that committing to coordinated networks of information gathering 
and shared solution generation can lead to breakout innovations, 
which may still allow net winners in this climate experiment in which 
we are all engaged, consciously or unconsciously.  
Arctic energy is arguably a climate winner context for those in a 
position to extract natural gas, yet the uncertainty of methane 
releases across the Arctic renders such energy gambling a higher 
stakes game than one involving only individual or energy sector injury 
or fiscal loss.36 With the horizontal hydraulic fracturing boom, the 
United States is glutted with natural gas and seeking export 
infrastructure, despite divergent public policies to expand renewable 
investment and commercialization. The national security reserves 
argument, which helped justify exempting hydraulic fracturing from 
federal environmental provisions to begin with, has not resurfaced as 
export options are explored. Leaving natural gas that can be 
horizontally hydraulically fractured in the ground rather than 
extracting it sounds less economically rational if energy conglomerates 
 
36. See Elizabeth Burleson, Polar Law and Good Governance, in 
Routledge Handbook of International Environmental Law, 
(Shawkat Alam et al. eds., 2012) (discussing the need for inclusive 
governance in the emerging legal area of commonly shared Artic 
natural-resource extraction). 
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like Shell estimate that Arctic undiscovered natural gas amounts to 
30 percent of the global supply.37 A perception of potential easy access 
to natural gas may dampen security concerns irrespective of which 
country has sovereignty over the largest natural gas reserves. Yet the 
International Law Commission has done important work on 
transboundary oil and gas resources and transboundary harm.38 While 
methane emissions associated with gas releases arguably fall into both 
transboundary climate harm and a waste of transboundary oil and 
gas, significant governance gaps remain in incentivizing investments 
that can reduce loss of methane and help bring natural gas to market. 
Modern economies are dependent upon steady supplies of energy, yet 
public interests do not end with energy access. They extend to human 
rights, civil liberties, and environmental integrity. The energy sector 
has yet to implement best practices that could better balance 
economic, social, and ecosystem service synergies. For instance, Shell’s 
ongoing failure to follow economic incentives or court orders to stop 
flaring is a direct violation of Nigerian law and economically irrational 
behavior.39 It is an open question whether oil and gas development in 
the Arctic will be conducted any more responsibly. As a starting 
point, where oil and gas companies are flaring natural gas as a 
byproduct in pursuit of oil, this Article argues that greater 
coordination among natural gas developers and those protecting the 
public interest in health and ecosystem integrity can reduce flaring 
and bring natural gas to market.40 
 
37. May Abdalla, The Alaskans Sitting on Billions of Barrels of Oil, BBC 
News (Nov. 29, 2012, 7:37 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-
20310752#sa-ns_mchannel=rss&ns_source=PublicRSS20-sa. 
38. See, e.g., Analytical Guide: Shared Natural Resources (Oil and Gas), 
Int’l L. Commission, http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/guide/8_6.htm (last 
updated May 16, 2012) (providing mandates, studies, and reports 
pertaining to oil and gas resources); Texts & Instruments: Prevention of 
Transboundary Damage from Hazardous Activities, Int’l L. 
Commission, http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/9_7.htm (last updated 
Sep. 22, 2011) (providing draft articles with commentaries on prevention 
of transboundary harm from hazardous activities). 
39. See Terry Macalister, Tullow Oil Given Licence to Flare Ugandan Gas, 
Guardian (Feb. 15, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/feb/ 
16/tullow-oil-uganda-agreement (“The flaring of gas in Nigeria is re-
garded as the biggest source of CO2 emissions in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Shell has repeatedly failed to follow through on premises to put an end 
to flaring, despite court orders demanding it stop.”). 
40. See, e.g., Kinder Morgan Absorbs Natural Gas Company for $5B, 
EEnews EnergyWire (Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.eenews.net/energy 
wire/rss/2013/01/31/10 (“U.S. gas and oil pipeline giant Kinder Morgan 
Energy Partners is acquiring midstream natural gas company Copano 
Energy LLC for roughly $5 billion in a move that could help Kinder 
reduce natural gas flare-ups at its oil sites.”). 
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The Energy Information Administration explains that  
[s]tarting in the mid-1970s, a partnership of private operators, 
the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and predecessor 
agencies, and the Gas Research Institute (GRI) endeavored to 
develop technologies for the commercial production of natural 
gas from . . . shale in the eastern United States. . . . [O]f the 
total 750 trillion cubic feet of technically recoverable shale gas 
resources[,] . . . the largest shale gas plays are the Marcellus 
(410.3 trillion cubic feet, 55 percent of the total), Haynesville 
(74.7 trillion cubic feet, 10 percent of the total), and Barnett 
(43.4 trillion cubic feet, 6 percent of the total). 41 
Since the oil and gas sector treats the Bakken Play as an oil rather 
than gas field, its significant natural gas resources are simply being 
wasted.42 While over a third of the Bakken Play natural gas resource 
is being flared,43 an international team of scientists has designed a 
catalyst that could break down methane. The bonds between the 
molecules in methane are hard to pull apart, requiring very high 
temperatures to sever. This catalyst, a university innovation 
benefiting from public investment, allows methane to be broken down 
at much lower temperatures by providing higher levels of oxygen for 
 
41. U.S Energy Info. Admin., Review of Emerging Resources: U.S. 
Shale Gas and Shale Oil Plays 4 (2011) (“The use of horizontal 
drilling in conjunction with hydraulic fracturing has greatly expanded 
the ability of producers to profitably recover natural gas and oil from 
low-permeability geologic plays—particularly, shale plays. Application of 
fracturing techniques to stimulate oil and gas production began to grow 
rapidly in the 1950s, although experimentation dates back to the 19th 
century.”). 
42. See id. at 5 tbl.1 (listing the lower forty-eight states as having the 
following quantities of shale gas in trillion cubic feet as of January 1, 2009 
(in descending order): Marcellus (410), Haynesville (75), Barnett (43), 
Fayetteville (32), Barnett-Woodford (32), Woodford (22), Eagle Ford 
(21), Mancos (21), Antrim (20), Devonian Low Thermal Maturity (14), 
Lewis (12), New Albany (11), Greater Sittstone (8), Big Sandy (7), 
Williston-Shallow Niobraran (7), Cana Woodford (6), Floyd-Neal & 
Conasauga (4), Hilliard-Baxter-Mancos (4), Cincinnati Arch (1), Avalon 
& Bone Springs (—), Bakken (—), Monterey/Santos (—)); see also U.S. 
Energy Info. Admin., Geology and Technology Drive Estimates of Techni-
cally Recoverable Resources, Today in Energy (July 20, 2012), http:// 
www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=7190 (providing graphs for 
comparison of recoverable shale gas formations to conventional tight oil).  
43. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Over One-Third of Natural Gas Produced in 
North Dakota is Flared or Otherwise Not Marketed, Today in Energy 
(Nov. 23, 2011), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=4030.  
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the reaction into water and carbon dioxide.44 This kind of 
technological innovation, combined with such governance innovation 
as coordinating cap and trade and methane reduction linkages, can 
help address climate instability. 
Despite much-needed breakthrough technologies, mitigating 
methane is also a straightforward task of implementing existing basic 
best practices. Perhaps the inability to see or smell methane has 
exacerbated the methane emission problem to date. If its status as a 
dangerous greenhouse gas is not appropriately recognized, then 
market failures and negative externalities are likely to continue. The 
following Section considers the governance capacity of the U.S. federal 
government in coordinating a genuine, timely shift from fossil fuels to 
renewables and efficiency.  
A. United States Federal Coordination? 
In 2012, President Obama issued an executive order entitled 
Supporting Safe and Responsible Development of Unconventional 
Domestic Natural Gas Resources.45 Why not have similar individual 
initiatives for wind and solar? Is conflict the primary driver of policy? 
If so, solar spats with China and Atlantic wind-siting scuffles pale in 
comparison to stakeholder animosity over horizontal hydraulic 
fracturing. The information that is trickling into the public domain is 
meeting with divergent interpretations by disparate stakeholders. 
Much depends upon initial assumptions used to simplify models. One 
cannot assume away that lungs rely on clean air, but one can assume 
a robust, healthy, adult set of lungs rather than more susceptible 
youth, elderly, or asthmatic lungs.46 Furthermore, while rural and 
urban lungs are indistinguishable absent pollution, greater 
concentrations of people in urban areas have led decision makers to 
prioritize a utilitarian, greatest-good-for-the-greatest-number approach 
 
44. Tiffany Stecker, New Catalyst Can Break Down Vehicle Methane 
Emissions, EEnews ClimateWire (Aug. 13, 2012), http://www. 
eenews.net/climatewire/rss/2012/08/13/6. 
45. Exec. Order No. 13,605, 77 Fed. Reg. 23,107, (Apr. 13, 2012) (establishing 
an Interagency Working Group “in order to coordinate the efforts of 
Federal agencies responsible for overseeing the safe and responsible 
development of unconventional domestic natural gas resources and 
associated infrastructure and to help reduce our dependence on oil”). 
46. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Information on Shale 
Resources, Development, and Environmental and Public Health 
Risks 33 (2012) (“[P]articles from the sand, if not properly contained by 
dust control mechanisms, can lodge in the lungs and potentially cause 
silicosis.”). The GAO produced a second report discussing additional 
health risks. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Unconventional 
Oil and Gas Development: Key Environmental and Public 
Health Requirements (2012). 
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to industry siting.47 This Article argues that health and environmental 
co-benefits can help incentivize reducing methane emissions. 
Offering a practically grounded, local land use solution, Professor 
John Nolon recommends that  
[l]ocalities interested in adopting effective and legally 
sustainable actions to control hydrofracking should add a 
component to their comprehensive plans regarding gas drilling, 
its impact on their communities, and the goals, objectives, 
strategies, and implementation measures they plan to adopt to 
control those impacts and to maximize the economic benefits of 
hydrofracking.48 
To this end, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) can 
cooperatively facilitate local responses through model comprehensive 
plan language, while recognizing that substate governance may be the 
best scale for some aspects of unconventional natural gas oversight. 
Here, dynamic governance coordination can involve cooperative 
governance that can optimize gas oversight and energy innovation. 
Maximizing energy access while minimizing environmental and 
social externalities may be a broad shared vision. For example, local 
fire departments might be best equipped to be first responders to 
emergencies at a well pad. Similarly, local police may have the 
greatest capacity to address the dangerous increase of industrial 
vehicle traffic on rural roads. At the other end of the spectrum, the 
EPA might be best positioned to set national chemical thresholds as 
it has done with diesel—setting it at zero for hydraulic fracturing 
operations.49 Between these two remains a vast, ambiguous 
governance gap where overlaps and underlaps have left a dangerous 
level of uncertainty. Where federal response capacity is too slow, local 
implementation of federally designed best practices may best be 
carried out by those most familiar with local contexts, be they 
 
47. See, e.g., Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386–87 
(1926) (establishing the constitutionality of single-use zoning under the 
state’s police power). 
48. John R. Nolon & Victoria Polidoro, Hydrofracking: Disturbances Both 
Geological and Political: Who Decides?, 44 Urb. Law. 507, 526–27 
(2012); see also Julie V. Iovine, Urban Development: Zoning Laws Grow 
Up, Wall St. J., Jan. 19, 2012, at D6 (“Zoning has always concerned 
itself, for better or worse, with social matters, such as banishing noxious 
uses . . . . [P]lanning commission[s are] moving from zoning that’s 
negative on social issues to being positive, like mandating green markets 
and bike rooms.”). 
49. See Hazardous Chemical Reporting: Community Right-to-Know, 40 
C.F.R § 370.10 (2012) (setting hazardous chemical reporting thresholds 
for underground diesel storage tanks); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f–300j 
(2006). 
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cultural or geological. Just as with climate mitigation and adaptation, 
preemption is an overly simplistic response to the need for new legal 
layers to address climate-energy-water challenges. States have been 
reeling from funding crises and it remains unclear how far drilling fees 
can spread to cover complex and expensive oversight of oil and gas 
system lifecycles. Federal pockets may be deeper, but actual resources 
to implement health and ecosystem service protection may be just as 
constrained. Drillers can be tasked with doing baseline tests prior to 
requesting permits, but this remains a small fraction of the oversight 
iterative process. That said, presuming industry contamination in the 
absence of baseline testing would incentivize testing rather than 
incentivize shoddy work. Doing so would be in the best interest of 
both drillers and landowners, by providing greater access to 
information with which to avoid conflicts. 
Global greenhouse gas emissions are not solely of local concern. 
Yet, it is harder to reduce all levels of methane rather than just make 
sure methane leakage does not migrate into drinking water supplies. 
While no level of governance has had sufficient data with which to 
understand the scope of natural gas system emissions, governance 
coordination can still respond to the natural gas boom with methane 
emissions measures. It can be difficult for local governments to have 
oil and gas experts on staff, but if model instruments can be used as 
best practices, then maybe local capacity building can fill governance 
gaps more quickly than federal efforts, which do not always make it 
past the study stage to actual oversight implementation. Measures 
that can help increase data collection, while protecting health and 
ecosystem services, include permitting gas development with emissions 
limits as well as requiring baseline tests, fiscal bonds, and annual 
emissions reports from developers. It remains an open question 
whether states have the oversight capacity to match their rates of 
unconventional natural gas permitting. For instance, Pennsylvania 
granted 250 permits from December 2012 to January 2013.50 It 
remains to be seen whether the state has the capacity to effectively 
regulate this scale of natural gas development. Even if well resourced, 
what do states have the ability to do vis-à-vis federal hydraulic 
fracturing exemptions? These legal quandaries remain perplexing to 
government officials and civil society alike.51  
 
50. Emily Collins, Permitting Shale Gas Development: Considering 
Subsurface Migration in UIC & Shale Gas Permitting Decisions, 
Remarks at Florida State Law Spring 2013 Environmental Forum (Feb. 
1, 2013), available at http://mediasite.apps.fsu.edu/Mediasite/Viewer/ 
?peid=497fc6a51c50493a9a7529bb15d9f5ef1d (at 00:34:48). 
51. See Tex. Water Code Ann. § 27.051(a)(1)–(3) (West 2012) (“The 
commission . . . may issue the permit if it finds: (1) that the use or 
installation of the injection well is in the public interest, . . . [and] (3) 
that, with proper safeguards, both ground and surface fresh water can 
be adequately protected from pollution . . . .”); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
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The EPA has a water study underway that may lead to 
reinstating federal regulations that were eliminated in the 
“Halliburton Loophole” of the Energy Act of 2005.52 Those seeking to 
expand hydraulic fracturing generally favor state over federal 
regulation, which raises public choice and participation questions 
regarding rent seeking and protection of public interest. Notably, 
40,000 public comments to the State of New York have broadened the 
deliberative process in the northern and most shallow section of the 
Marcellus Shale Play. On the national level, while Congress retains 
power to regulate unconventional natural gas development under the 
Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the federal government 
has generally left oil and gas regulation to the states. Few 
environmental or public health advocates at present have a 
comprehensive understanding of gas engineering and law, state-
specific mineral leasing requirements, or intellectual and other 
property law dimensions. 
Hydrofracking became economical by carving out responsibility 
for such negative externalities as pollution. Other factors include 
rising fossil fuel prices as well as technological advances in drilling 
horizontally using high-pressure hydraulic fracturing. The oil and gas 
industry successfully lobbied for exemptions for hydrofracking from 
several major federal environmental laws, many of which went into 
effect with the enactment of the Energy Policy Act of 2005.53 In 
particular, industry lobbying succeeded in removing hydraulic 
fracturing from federal drinking water measures.54 This has come to be 
known as the “Halliburton Loophole” to the Safe Drinking Water Act 
(SDWA).55 Oil and gas drilling activities were also generally exempt 
from the Clean Air Act (CAA),56 Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA, commonly 
 
§ 6111.044 (West 2011) (“If the application demonstrates that the 
proposed activities will not comply or will pose an unreasonable risk of 
inducing seismic activity, inducing geologic fracturing, or contamination 
of an underground source of drinking water, the director shall deny the 
application.”). 
52. See Press Release, EPA, EPA Initiates Hydraulic Fracturing Study: 
Agency Seeks Input from Science Advisory Board (Mar. 18, 2010); Press 
Release, EPA, EPA’s Science Advisory Board Announces Independent 
Panel to Peer Review Agency’s Hydraulic Fracturing Research (Mar. 25, 
2013). 
53. See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 318, 119 Stat. 594, 
693 (2005). 
54. See id. § 322 (excluding certain elements of hydrofracking from SDWA). 
55. See 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1) (2006) (excluding “hydraulic fracturing 
operations” from the definition of “underground injection”). 
56. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671 (regulating air quality and emission 
limitations). 
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known as “Superfund”),57 and Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act.58 These statutes may still cover aspects of oil and gas 
processing.59 Hannah Wiseman has discussed the manner in which 
Congress has exempted many hydraulic fracturing activities from 
federal provisions.60 Fragmented federal provisions still address limited 
unconventional natural gas development under such statutes as the 
CWA, SDWA, NEPA, Endangered Species Act,61 CAA, Emergency 
Planning and Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA),62 and 
CERCLA. 
Public choice theory considers rent seeking behavior. Stake 
holders do not always find common ground on what constitutes public 
interest as opposed to mere rent seeking. I argue that the rent seeking 
that resulted in carving a loophole out of the federal Safe Drinking 
Water Act and other public health and environmental provisions left 
a net loss to society. This net loss transferred wealth to extractive 
industries that no longer had to internalize the economic and social 
costs of operation when developing unconventional natural gas 
resources. Instead, the costs have been transferred to the international 
community that has already found it challenging to reduce methane 
and other greenhouse gasses, to communities that have had to 
respond to water contamination absent sufficient information with 
which to do so, and to individual residents drinking contaminated 
water and breathing high doses of life-shortening chemicals. This can 
be expressed in either complex medical, chemical, legal, and economic 
terms or in the most articulate, bravest way that impacted 
 
57. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (regulating hazardous substances releases, 
liability, and compensation).  
58. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k (regulating solid waste disposal). 
59. Regulation of Oil and Gas Construction Activities, EPA, http://cfpub. 
epa.gov/npdes/stormwater/oilgas.cfm (last updated Mar. 9, 2009). 
60. See Wiseman, supra note 11, at 117 (noting that “Congress’ exemption 
of fracing from the Safe Drinking Water Act involved two types of 
regulatory failure”); see also Hannah Wiseman, Regulatory Adaptation 
in Fractured Appalachia, 21 Vill. Envtl. L.J. 229, 250–51 n.125 (2010) 
(listing and explaining exceptions); Emily C. Powers, Fracking and 
Federalism: Support for an Adaptive Approach that Avoids the Tragedy 
of the Regulatory Commons, 19 J.L. & Pol’y 913, 938–39 (2011) 
(discussing the Energy Policy Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. § 15801, and the 
exempting of hydraulic fracturing processes from the Safe Drinking 
Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f–300j).  
61. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544. For a discussion of the interaction of the 
Endangered Species Act and hydraulic fracturing, see Kaylani Robbins, 
Awakening the Slumbering Giant: How Horizontal Drilling Technology 
Brought the Endangered Species Act to Bear on Hydraulic Fracturing, 
63 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1143 (2013). 
62. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11004–11049. 
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stakeholders know how during due process opportunities. Inclusive 
decision-making forums have been few and far between. Aggregating 
such insights can help reintegrate externalities into the cost of 
production. 
In the vacuum of federal governance, jurisdictions and 
stakeholders have brought suits against one another to act or refrain 
from acting to regulate unconventional natural gas extraction.63 Some 
legal handles to regulate flaring include implementing any remaining 
federal authority over unconventional natural gas extraction and 
enacting a variation of the proposed FRAC Act to reauthorize federal 
oversight of key unconventional natural gas development processes.64 
Given the current lack of momentum to pass the FRAC Act, what are 
the federal options to address this new problem of widespread natural 
gas flaring associated with horizontal hydraulic fracturing? How can 
the federal government optimize coordination with states through 
dynamic governance to fill existing governance gaps? For instance, 
when wells lack proper casing and cementing, stray gas can migrate 
from the wellbore.65 In addition to this indirect leakage, gas developers 
vent and flair methane during normal operations and to reduce 
pressure in emergencies. The EPA’s Mandatory Greenhouse Gas 
Reporting Program66 encompasses methane and carbon dioxide 
emissions reporting for distributors and facilities emitting over 25,000 
metric tons of greenhouse gases annually.67 Yet, the EPA does not 
require greenhouse gas emission reductions through this program.68 
 
63. See generally Hydraulic Fracturing Case Chart, Arnold & Porter 
LLP, http://www.arnoldporter.com/resources/documents/Hydraulic%20 
Fracturing%20Case%20Chart.pdf (last updated Nov. 13, 2012) (providing a 
chart of the type of lawsuits brought and the names of the various cases). 
64. Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals Act, S. 587, 
112th Cong. (2011) (known as the FRAC Act). 
65. “A Duke University study found drinking water methane concentrations 
to be seventeen times higher in active drilling and extraction areas than in 
non-active areas.” Elizabeth Burleson, Cooperative Federalism and 
Hydraulic Fracturing: A Human Right to a Clean Environment, 22 
Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 289, 295 (2012) (citing Stephen G. Osborn 
et al., Methane Contamination of Drinking Water Accompanying Gas—
Well Drilling and Hydraulic Fracturing, 108 Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sci. 
8172, 8173 (2011)). 
66. See generally 40 C.F.R. § 98 (2011) (setting out the general provisions 
for the mandatory greenhouse gas reporting); see also Oil and Natural 
Gas Sector: New Source Performance Standards and National Emission 
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Reviews, 77 Fed. Reg. 49,490 
(Aug. 16, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § pts. 60 and 63). 
67. 40 C.F.R. § 98.2 (2011). 
68. See id. § 98.1 (requiring reporting of greenhouse gas emissions rather 
than reductions). 
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This program, combined with EPA’s Tailoring Rule,69 do not 
adequately incentivize greenhouse gas mitigation, which at some point 
should be recognized as a failure to abide by international obligations 
under the Framework Climate Convention commitments to report 
and implement iterative mitigation targets and programs. 
On a positive note, the EPA Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program 
has increased access to information with which to make key energy-
climate decisions. The natural gas sector had to report for the first 
time by January 16, 2013, detailing 2011 emissions. In 2011, roughly 
8,000 facilities in nine industry sectors reported 3.3 billion tons of 
carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e), including direct emissions of carbon 
dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and fluorinated gases.70 Notably, this 
reporting requirement did not encompass indirect emissions, which 
places it in a comparable position to the Clean Water Act’s weak link 
on non-point source pollution. That said, it is worth having any data 
with which to assess natural gas emissions.  
Pursuant to the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008, the 
EPA established the Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program requiring 
annual reporting of greenhouse gas data and other relevant 
information from large direct emissions sources and suppliers of 
certain fossil fuels and industrial gases in the United States.71 This 
initiative to generate and share climate information could certainly be 
more robust, accurate and timely in order for public-private life cycle 
analysis, but it is an important step in the right direction toward 
understanding “emissions from specific industries, emissions from 
individual facilities, factors that influence greenhouse gas emission 
rates, and actions that facilities could take to reduce emissions.”72 
Generally, a facility directly emitting 25,000 metric tons of carbon 
 
69. See EPA, Final Rule: Prevention of Significant Deterioration 
and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule (2010) (discussing 
how Clean Air Act permitting program requirements will apply to 
carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluoro-
carbons, and sulfur hexafluoride beginning in 2011). 
70. GHGRP 2011: Reported Data, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/ghgreporting 
/ghgdata/reported/index.html (last updated Feb. 5, 2013) (“Over 6,200 
facilities across 29 source categories reported GHG data for [Reporting 
Year] 2010. In 2011, 12 additional source categories began monitoring 
GHG data and reported GHG data for the first time in 2012. The 
addition of these 12 new source categories brings the total coverage of 
the GHGRP to 41 source categories.”). In contrast to just reporting 
emissions, and for a discussion of a stronger approach taken in the 
context of the FDA, see generally Barbara L. Atwell, Products Liability 
and Preemption: A Judicial Framework, 39 Buff. L. Rev. 181 (1991). 
71. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, 121 Stat. 
1844 (2007). 
72. Greenhouse Gas, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/enviro/facts/ghg (last 
updated Feb. 4, 2013). 
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dioxide equivalent or more annually must report annual emissions to 
EPA. Furthermore, certain suppliers of products that could emit 
greenhouse gases also must report. Less than 5 percent of facilities 
emitted over 50 percent of 2011 emissions, suggesting that the federal 
regulation may be a good level at which to do the heavy lifting of 
incentivizing concentrated industry greenhouse gas emission 
reductions. Table 1 shows how the power plant, oil and gas, refinery, 
and chemical sectors produce the bulk of greenhouse gas emissions in 
that order. 
Table 1: Top Sectors Required to Report Carbon  
Equivalence Emissions to EPA73 
Industry Sector Number of Reporters Emissions 
(Million Metric Tons CO2e) 
Power Plants 1,594 2,221 
Petroleum and 
Natural Gas 
Systems  
1,880 225 
Refineries 145 182 
Chemicals  458 180 
 
New EPA requirements to report oil, gas, and coal methane 
emissions reveal an 82.6-million-metric-ton methane contribution to 
climate destabilization that was, until 2013, off the public radar.74 The 
EPA estimates that the new ruling will have the co-benefit of 
lowering methane by up to 1.7 million tons.75 Based on my 
aggregation of the disparate data sets spread out across an interactive 
state-by-state EPA map, I calculated that in 2011 petroleum and 
natural gas systems reported emitting 7,392,982 million metric tons of 
CO2e. The EPA database portal FLIGHT enables anyone with 
Internet access to view summary information, including facility maps, 
and to “easily search, sort, and download data.”76 While the scope of 
Confidential Business Information (CBI) and indirect emissions 
 
73. GHGRP 2011: Reported Data, supra note 70. 
74. Tiffany Stecker, First-time Reports from Industry Reveal Massive 
Methane Emissions, EEnews ClimateWire (Feb. 6, 2013), http:// 
www.eenews.net/public/climatewire/2013/02/06/2. 
75. Id. 
76. GHGRP 2011: Reported Data, supra at note 70; see also id. (mapping 
greenhouse gas emissions by sector using an interactive map of the 
United States); 2011 Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Large Facilities, 
EPA, available at http://ghgdata.epa.gov/ghgp/main.do (last updated 
Jan. 15, 2013) (mapping greenhouse gas emissions by sector using an 
interactive map of the United States); see also EPA Greenhouse Gas 
Reporting Program, Petroleum and Natural Gas Systems, EPA, 
available at http://www.epa.gov/ghgreporting/ghgdata/reported/petroleum. 
html (last updated Feb. 14, 2013) (providing more environmental data). 
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warrants substantial further study, the initial stages of EPA efforts to 
shine light on the U.S. greenhouse gas footprint can help facilitate 
genuine climate mitigation. Whether this is done in a timely manner 
remains to be seen. 
Notably, unconventional natural gas operations that are under 
25,000 metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent or more annually are 
not required to report—including a significant number of small, 
temporary but significant emitters extracting and releasing natural 
gas. 
Indirect emissions through releases that are not directly emitted, 
but rather leaked, are also still invisible in the life cycle analysis data 
points available. Here, casing remains an issue, as do abandoned wells, 
if large-scale methane is reaching the atmosphere via fugitive leakage 
rather than directly flowing up the intended well.77  
Table 2: Petroleum and Natural Gas Systems Sector—Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions Reported to EPA in million metric tons CO2e78 
Number of facilities:  1,880
Total emissions (CO2e): 225
Emissions by greenhouse gas (CO2e) 
• Carbon dioxide (CO2): 
• Methane (CH4): 
• Nitrous oxide (N2O): 
142
83
1
 
Natural gas development has risen by more than 20 percent over 
the past five years79 due to a shale gas boom stimulated by horizontal 
drilling and hydraulic fracturing combined with a weakening of federal 
 
77. Overview of Final Amendments to Air Regulations for the 
Oil and Natural Gas Industry, supra note 6, at 3–4 (“The oil and 
gas industry is a significant source of VOCs, which contribute to the 
formation of ground-level ozone (smog). Data provided to EPA’s 
Natural Gas STAR Program show that some of the largest air emissions 
in the natural gas industry occur as natural gas wells that have been 
fractured are being prepared for production. During a stage of well 
completion known as ‘flowback,’ fracturing fluids, water, and reservoir 
gas come to the surface at a high velocity and volume. This mixture 
includes a high volume of VOCs and methane, along with air toxics 
such as benzene, ethylbenzene and n-hexane. The typical flowback 
process lasts from three to 10 days. Pollution also is emitted from other 
processes and equipment in the industry that prepare gas for sale and 
that assist in moving it through pipelines. . . . Many Gas STAR 
partners already are using the green completions that EPA is now 
requiring across the industry.”); see also Natural Gas STAR Program, 
EPA, http://www.epa.gov/gasstar/index.html (last updated Feb. 22, 
2013) (discussing Gas STAR partner’s voluntary participation). 
78. Petroleum and Natural Gas Systems, supra note 76. 
79. Nicholas M. Bianco et al., World Res. Inst., Can the U.S. Get 
There from Here? Using Existing Federal Laws and State 
Action to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions 49 (2013). 
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regulations on hydraulic fracturing. The EPA’s evolving gas emissions 
inventory remains a moving target.80 
The EPA recognizes that  
CH4 emissions are not necessarily directly related to production. 
CH4 emissions occur not just during mining, but also during the 
pre-mining stage and after mining is completed. In addition, the 
actual gas levels of a mine can vary significantly based on 
geologic factors. More accurate estimation would include 
information on the gas levels of mines in particular regions and 
mine operations in the pre-mining and post-mining stages.81  
Yet the EPA has relied on pre-hydraulic-fracturing-boom data and 
explained that “[i]f emissions are not reported and [Energy 
Information Administration] production data are not available, EPA 
assumed zero emissions for this source.”82 The EPA admits that 
[c]urrent emissions calculations are based on quantity of oil and 
gas production and consumption. However, leakage and venting 
do not necessarily increase linearly with throughput, and newer 
equipment tends to leak less than older equipment. More 
accurate estimation methodologies would make use of counts of 
equipment and country-specific emission factors, but such 
information is not readily available for many countries. Even 
when more accurate methodologies are used, estimates for this 
source have significant uncertainty. . . . Abandoned mines are 
not considered in this analysis due to a lack of data.83  
As a result, understanding the scope of climate destabilization due to 
unconventional natural gas production remains largely guesswork 
since insufficient monitoring and analysis have been undertaken to 
understand the scope of natural gas emissions.  
This Article argues that EPA, state, local, and non-state actor 
cooperation can best achieve natural gas system rules that minimize 
methane as a greenhouse gas. The EPA set forth a timeline that until 
January 2015, natural gas system operators can flare or capture but 
 
80. See, e.g., Harvey et al., Leaking Profits 12 (2012) (“The largest 
change in methane emission estimates has been in accounting for 
wellhead and well pad processing facilities emissions that were 
substantially underestimated. . . . Revised emissions estimates range 
from 11 times higher for well venting from liquids unloading, to 36 times 
higher for gas well venting from conventional well completions, to 3,540 
and 8,800 times higher for gas well venting during well workovers and 
completions of unconventional wells, respectively.”).  
81. EPA, Global Anthropogenic Non-CO2 Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions: 1990–2030 § 3.2.2 (2012). 
82. Id. § 7.1.1. 
83. Id. § 3.1.2.  
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should no longer be venting. Beyond January 2015, methane capture 
would be required of natural gas system operators who would no longer 
be allowed to conduct large scale flaring in the United States. As a 
result of litigation from both ends of the spectrum, the EPA is recon-
sidering both scope and timeframe.84 In the meantime, some drillers are 
locked into contracts but generally operating at a loss given the low 
price of natural gas. With regard to the public interest, venting is a net 
welfare loss to society and flaring only marginally less so. Addressing 
these interrelated methane emission market and governance failures 
should be a priority for the EPA, Bureau of Land Management, 
states, tribes, substate governments, and non-state actors. 
A dynamic governance response to the unconventional natural gas 
contribution to climate destabilization does not depend upon perfect 
natural gas life cycle understanding, just as the 2012 EPA rules on 
volatile organic compound and air toxics did not need to have perfect 
information. It is difficult to analyze a moving target given the rate of 
fuel switching from coal to natural gas underway in the electricity 
sector. That said, it is not impossible or even prohibitive. It is a key 
to making important energy-climate-water decisions going forward. 
The EPA is in a position to immediately incentivize natural gas 
reductions pursuant to the Clean Air Act. 
 
84. Jessica Coomes, Air Quality Standards: EPA to Re-Examine Fracking 
Air Rule, Wants Legal Challenges to Be Put on Hold, 44 Env’t Rep. 
(BNA) 201 (Jan. 25, 2013), available at http://news.bna.com/erln/ 
ERLNWB/split_display.adp?fedfid=29304452&vname=ernotallissues&jd
=a0d6b2y8t5 (“The Environmental Protection Agency told a federal 
appeals court it will reconsider aspects of air pollution standards for 
natural gas hydraulic fracturing operations and has laid out a schedule for 
further rulemaking (American Petroleum Institute v. EPA, D.C. Cir., No. 
12-1405, motion filed 1/16/13). EPA asked the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit on Jan. 16 to put the legal challenges on 
hold during the administrative reconsideration process. EPA did not 
specify which issues would be reconsidered. The agency also wants to 
separate the challenges into two cases. One case would focus on new 
source performance standards, and the other would address the challenge 
to national emissions standards for hazardous air pollutants. EPA’s 
August 2012 final rule addressed both types of standards (77 Fed. Reg. 
49,490). EPA asked the court to hold the new source performance 
standards issues in abeyance until Aug. 30 and the air toxics issues until 
May 30, 2014. EPA said it intends to reconsider some new source 
performance standards on an expedited schedule with a proposed rule by 
March 29 and a final rule by July 31. If necessary, other new source issues 
would be addressed in a proposed rule by Dec. 17 and a final rule by Nov. 
25, 2014. A proposed rule on the air toxics reconsideration is expected by 
April 30, 2014, and a final rule by March 31, 2015.”); see also Letter from 
Eric T. Schneiderman, N.Y. Attorney Gen., et al., to Lisa P. Jackson, 
Adm’r, EPA, (Dec. 11, 2012), available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/pdfs/ 
ltr_NSPS_Methane_Notice.pdf (seven states, led by New York, served 
a formal notice of intent to sue the EPA under the Clean Air Act).  
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Pace Energy and Climate Center Director Franz Litz, in legal 
partnership with World Resources Institute, has mapped energy-
climate ways forward. These include integrated federal-state 
coordination.85 I argue that in addition to cooperative federalism, 
transboundary inclusive decision making can close the climate natural 
gas governance gap. Increased unconventional natural gas develop-
ment can be expected to lead to more methane leakage.86 Globally 
this presents both opportunities and challenges. It is hard to find 
lower lying fruit when trying to mitigate greenhouse gasses than the 
venting and flaring of natural gas. At the same time, governance 
coordination to mitigate natural gas emissions does require initial 
investment in establishing and supporting networks among 
international institutions, states, regional entities such as the EU, 
tribes, provinces, local governments, and non-state actors with 
expertise ranging from local insights to academic modeling expertise 
to industry experience. Through coordination programs such as the 
2012 EPA regulations that reduce emissions of volatile organic 
compounds (VOCs), these entities can model best practices for 
minimizing fugitive methane emissions.87 The EPA predicted that the 
combined rules will yield a cost savings of $11 to $19 million in 
2015, because the value of natural gas and condensate that will 
 
85. Bianco et al., supra note 79, at 10 (“Given that it is unlikely that 
federal action will occur without state action or that state action will 
occur without federal action, we analyzed emissions scenarios with both 
federal and state action. States can be expected to continue to be active 
in areas of traditional state purview such as energy resource planning 
and energy efficiency, while also compensating for weak federal action. 
To capture this dynamic, we modeled varying levels of action for federal 
and state action.”) 
86. See id. at 12 (“Extraction of natural gas in the United States has 
increased by over 25 percent over the period of 2005 to 2011 due to 
rapid development of shale gas resources.”).  
87. See Oil and Natural Gas Sector: New Source Performance Standards 
and National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Reviews, 
77 Fed. Reg. 49,490, 49,490 (Aug. 16, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pts. 60 and 63) (“This action finalizes the review of new source 
performance standards for the listed oil and natural gas source category. 
In this action the EPA revised the new source performance standards 
for volatile organic compounds from leaking components at onshore 
natural gas processing plants and new source performance standards for 
sulfur dioxide emissions from natural gas processing plants.”); see also 
77 Fed. Reg. 56,422 (Sept. 12, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9 
and 60) (amending new source performance standards for petroleum 
refinery process heaters and flaring systems); Standards of Performance 
for Petroleum Refineries for Which Construction, Reconstruction, or 
Modification Commenced After May 14, 2007, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,425 
(Sept. 12, 2012) (predicting net annual savings of $79 million given the 
value of gas captured). 
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be recovered and sold will offset costs. . . . EPA’s Regulatory 
Impact Analysis for the rule estimates the value of the climate 
co-benefits that would result from this reduction at $440 million 
annually by 2015. This includes the value of climate-related 
benefits such as avoided health impacts, crop damage and 
damage to coastal properties.88  
The new source performance standards for the Crude Oil and Natural 
Gas Production source category regulate VOC emissions from gas 
wells, centrifugal compressors, reciprocating compressors, pneumatic 
controllers, storage vessels, and leaking components at onshore 
natural gas processing plants, as well as sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions 
from onshore natural gas processing plants.89 The final rules review 
four petroleum and natural gas industry air regulations under the 
Clean Air Act: (1) a new source performance standard for VOCs, (2) 
a new source performance standard for sulfur dioxide, (3) an air toxics 
standard for major sources of oil and natural gas production, and (4) 
an air toxics standard for major sources of natural gas transmission 
and storage. The EPA explains: 
The Clean Air Act requires EPA to set new source performance 
standards . . . for industrial categories that cause, or 
significantly contribute to, air pollution that may endanger 
public health or welfare. EPA is required to review these 
standards every eight years. The existing [new source 
performance standards]—for VOCs and [sulfur dioxide]—were 
issued in 1985.90  
 
88. Overview of Final Amendments to Air Regulations for the 
Oil and Natural Gas Industry, supra note 6, at 2–3. 
89. Id. at 3 (“The VOCs and air toxics reductions in the rules are expected 
to improve outdoor air quality, protect against cancer risk from air 
toxics emissions and reduce health effects associated with exposure to 
ground-level ozone (smog). Exposure to ozone is linked to increased 
asthma attacks, hospital admissions and emergency room visits, and 
premature death. EPA was unable to model health benefit estimates for 
the rule, due to uncertainties about future locations of oil and gas 
emissions. Air quality changes associated with air toxics and VOC 
reductions can be highly localized.”). 
90. Id. at 4 (“In January 2009, WildEarth Guardians and the San Juan 
Citizens Alliance sued EPA, alleging that the Agency had failed to 
review the new source performance standards and the major source air 
toxic standards for the oil and natural gas industry. In February 2010, 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia issued a consent 
decree that requires EPA to take actions related to the review of these 
standards. EPA issued the proposed rule July 28, 2011. The consent 
decree, which was recently revised, required that EPA take final action 
by April 17, 2012.”).  
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While this takes a clear snapshot, it remains a snapshot that, like 
economic models, provides great clarity but finite scope. For instance, 
it remains murky what natural gas emissions occur in processes not 
covered by this rule (for example, either because data is not required 
for operations generating less than 25,000 metric tons of CO2e or 
because natural gas emissions are a byproduct of another energy 
development process). Worrisome information gaps remain with 
regard to natural gas leakage from the Arctic generally as the climate 
destabilizes, aggregate emissions from hydropower as vegetation 
releases methane from the bottom of artificial lakes, or from fossil fuel 
production processes that accidentally or by design emit natural gas 
as a byproduct.91  
The EPA explains that:  
For fractured and refractured gas wells, the rule generally requires 
owners/operators to use reduced emissions completions, also 
known as ‘‘RECs’’ or ‘‘green completions,’’ to reduce VOC 
emissions from well completions. To achieve these VOC 
reductions, owners and/or operators may use RECs or completion 
combustion devices, such as flaring, until January 1, 2015; as of 
January 1, 2015, owners and/or operators must use RECs and a 
completion combustion device. The rule does not require RECs 
where their use is not feasible, as specified in the rule.92  
While the timeframe of implementation is now a moving target, this 
is a prudent first step in genuinely minimizing natural gas emissions 
in the face of imminent or surpassed climate tipping points. After 
deliberation with industry and other stakeholders, the EPA balanced 
concerns by having the requirement commence in 2015 so that 
equipment supply chains can smoothly meet demand for green 
completion technology. Colorado, Montana, and Wyoming already 
 
91. See, for example, Oil and Natural Gas Sector: New Source Performance 
Standards and National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air 
Pollutants Reviews, 77 Fed. Reg. at 49,492, distinguishing between 
natural gas wells and oil wells: “The rule covers any gas well that is ‘an 
onshore well drilled principally for production of natural gas.’ Oil wells 
(wells drilled principally for the production of crude oil) are not subject 
to this rule.” 
92. Id.; see also Harvey et al., supra note 80, at 19 (“In a green 
completion, the operator brings temporary processing equipment to a 
well site during wellbore cleanup. Well cleanup fluids and gases are 
routed to the temporary processing equipment. Fluids, debris, and gas 
are separated, and gas and condensate are recovered for sale. The 
temporary processing equipment required for a green completion 
typically includes gas-liquid-sand separator traps, portable separators, 
portable gas dehydration units, additional tanks, and, sometimes, small 
compressors.”). 
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require green completions, as does Fort Worth, Texas.93 Once such 
state and local governance best practices are shared through 
governance networks, first instance technical expertise may be less 
important than general knowledge of industry best practices combined 
with incentives to advance technologies in ways that continue to be 
best practices in economic, social, and environmental contexts. 
The natural gas boom has been an education in mining technology 
for many members of the general public concerned with health and 
environmental impacts. It helps to have cooperation among the drilling, 
health, and ecosystem services communities to identify and share 
optimal technical options including: “desiccant dehydrators to reduce 
emissions during dehydration of wet gas; improved compressor 
maintenance to reduce emissions during processing; hot taps in 
maintenance of pipelines during transmission; and vapor recovery units 
to reduce emissions during storage.”94 Responding to Oliver Houck’s 
University of Oregon Human Rights and Environment Symposium 
challenge that singing Kumbaya is not enough,95 it is important to 
emphasize that state and non-state coordination does not end with 
cooperative agreements as evidenced by the EPA/industry agreement 
that benzene would not be used in hydraulic fracturing. Non-binding 
agreements may sufficiently bind corporate responsibility and initiate 
innovative break out solution generation through shared insights. Yet 
they do not do all the heavy lifting.96  
EPA’s Natural Gas Star program has successfully gathered 
industry best practices and shared innovations to reduce methane 
emissions. This program recognized that methane emissions reduction 
is extremely important for health and environmental integrity, not to 
mention profitable, and significant headway has been made to bring 
best practices into broad commercial viability. Yet as NRDC notes, 
“Existing market forces, government regulations, and voluntary 
 
93. Colo. Code Regs. § 404-1:805(b)(3) (2013); Mont. Admin. R. 17.8.1711 
(2006); Fort Worth, Tex., Code of Ordinances art. 2, ch. 15, § 15-
30 (2013); see also Harvey et al., supra note 80, at 21 (discussing the 
green completion equipment requirements in Colorado, Texas, Montana 
and Wyoming). 
94. Bianco et al., supra note 79, at 50.  
95. Oliver A. Houck, Professor, Tulane Univ. Law Sch., Keynote Address at 
the Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation Symposium: New 
Directions for Human Rights and the Environment (Sept. 29, 2012), 
available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=otmC5EpKXpg. 
96. See, e.g., Ellen M. Gilmer, State Revokes Company’s Permits After 
Wastewater Dumping, EEnews EnergyWire (Feb. 8, 2013), http:// 
www.eenews.net/energywire/rss/2013/02/08/7 (“Ohio regulators have 
permanently revoked the operating permits for two companies involved 
in dumping thousands of gallons of drilling wastewater into a 
Youngstown-area system that links to public drinking water.”). 
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programs are only leading to the capture of a small percentage of 
methane emissions at present.”97 EPA’s Natural Gas STAR Program 
estimates 50 percent of its oil and gas methane mitigation to green 
completions.98 Only 20 percent of U.S. gas well emissions are captured 
through green completions so far.99  
NRDC has identified the following technologies that can reduce 
over 80 percent of the petroleum and natural gas sector’s methane 
emissions if used industry wide: 
1. Green Completions to capture oil and gas well emissions 
2. Plunger Lift Systems or other well deliquification methods to 
mitigate gas well emissions 
3. Tri-Ethylene Glycol (TEG) Dehydrator Emission Controls to 
capture emissions from dehydrators 
4. Desiccant Dehydrators to capture emissions from dehydrators 
5. Dry Seal Systems to reduce emissions from centrifugal 
compressor seals 
6. Improved Compressor Maintenance to reduce emissions from 
reciprocating compressors 
7. Low-Bleed or No-Bleed Pneumatic Controllers used to reduce 
emissions from control devices 
8. Pipeline Maintenance and Repair to reduce emissions from 
pipelines 
9. Vapor Recovery Units used to reduce emissions from storage 
tanks 
 
97. Harvey et al., supra note 80, at 14; see also id. at 23 (“Plunger lift 
systems work by using the natural gas pressure that builds up in the 
casing tubing annulus to push a metal plunger up the well tubing, 
forcing a column of fluid to the surface. Gas and liquids are both 
collected. Liquids are separated from the gas, which is then routed to 
the pipeline for sale.”). 
98. Id. at 20; see id. at 15 (“[I]t is important to note that the EPA’s Natural 
Gas STAR Program emission reduction estimates are based on data 
voluntarily submitted by industry. These data represent a very rough 
estimate of the amount of methane control that may have been achieved 
to date, because they were not developed using common and rigorous 
metering, measurement, quality control, or audit procedures. Therefore, 
some caution should be exercised in assuming that this amount of 
emissions reduction has been fully achieved.”). See generally Natural Gas 
STAR Program Accomplishments, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/gasstar/ 
accomplishments/index.html (last updated Apr. 18, 2013). 
99. Harvey et al., supra note 80, at 21. 
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10. Leak Monitoring and Repair to control fugitive emissions 
from valves, flanges, seals, connections and other equipment100 
NRDC projects that green completions and plunger lift systems alone 
can reduce almost 40 percent of methane emissions. 101 Where gas 
pipelines are too far away, green completion capturing of natural gas 
can enhance the local affordable power supply, on site power 
generation, and well performance through reinjection.102 While the 
trend is towards increasingly treating methane as a valued resource, 
the EPA will not require green completions for “[n]ew exploratory 
(‘wildcat’) wells or delineation wells (used to define the borders of a 
natural gas reservoir), because they are not near a pipeline to bring 
the gas to market” or for “[h]ydraulically fractured low-pressure wells, 
where natural gas cannot be routed to the gathering line. Operators 
may use a simple formula based on well depth and well pressure to 
determine whether a well is a low-pressure well.”103 The EPA 
estimates that 10 percent of hydraulically fractured wells are low 
pressure.104 
 
100. Id. at 5. (“When development occurs on public lands, use of the 
technologies can result in royalty payments to the government from the 
sale of captured methane . . . . If better operating conditions and profits 
are not enough incentive to implement these projects, policies that 
mandate emissions control will be necessary to achieve the full potential 
of these methane control technologies.”). 
101. Id.; see also EPA, Lessons Learned from Natural Gas STAR 
Partners: Installing Plunger Lift Systems in Gas Wells 1, 4 
(2006) (“Liquid loading of the wellbore is often a serious problem in aging 
production wells. Operators commonly use beam lift pumps or remedial 
techniques, such as venting or ‘blowing down’ the well to atmospheric 
pressure, to remove liquid buildup and restore well productivity. These 
techniques, however, result in gas losses. In the case of blowing down a 
well, the process must be repeated over time as fluids reaccumulate, 
resulting in additional methane emissions. . . . The most significant 
benefit of plunger lift installations is the resulting increase in gas 
production. During the decision process, the increase in production cannot 
be measured directly and must be estimated. The methodology for 
estimating this expected incremental production varies depending on the 
state of the well. The methodology for continuous or non-declining wells is 
relatively straightforward. In contrast, the methodology for estimating the 
incremental production for wells in decline is more complex.”). 
102. See Installing Plunger Lift Systems in Gas Wells, supra note 
101, at 1 (discussing the benefits of plunger lift systems). 
103. EPA, EPA’s Air Rules for the Oil & Natural Gas Industry: 
Summary of Requrements [sic] for Processes and Equipment at 
Natural Gas Well Sites 2 (2012). 
104. See EPA to Phase in First Emissions Standards for Natural Gas 
Fracking Operations by 2015, Bloomberg BNA, (Apr. 20, 2012), 
http://news.bna.com/erln/ERLNWB/split_display.adp?fedfid=2585872
9&vname=ernotallissues&jd=a0d1n8e4t0&split=0 (“The final rule also 
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It appears to be a chicken and egg problem to ask whether 
smaller hydraulic fracturing and related unconventional natural gas 
operations need to report given the lack of monitoring of fugitive 
natural gas to date. At the ends of the spectrum, very large and very 
small entities can safely estimate whether reporting is compulsory 
given the 25,000 metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent threshold. It 
is not clear how many entities will underreport or fail to report due to 
a lack of information on actual natural gas emissions from their 
operations. While not a satisfying conclusion, an important first step 
in this context would be robust field analysis of actual greenhouse gas 
emissions to determine whether few, half, or most hydraulic fracturing 
operations fall into this reporting requirement. What is clear is that 
all operations beyond the United States do not have to report to the 
EPA, yet many such entities are beginning to model their natural gas 
initiatives on U.S. unconventional natural gas approaches. If this is 
done globally, absent reporting and mitigation requirements, then the 
natural gas sector will mushroom as a climate destabilization driver. 
At present, “[g]lobal warming pollution from natural gas systems 
accounts for approximately 4 percent of U.S. emissions.”105 
To my mind, incentivizing natural gas system methane reductions 
is one of the best ways to achieve near term climate mitigation. Under 
section 111 of the Clean Air Act106 for new and existing natural gas 
systems, the EPA can incentivize the minimization of natural gas 
emissions by cooperatively implementing, monitoring, and enforcing 
methane and related pollutant (for example, VOC) emissions 
performance standards. The EPA made an important first stride with 
its 2012 petroleum and natural gas ruling. Just as regulating 
mercury107 can have the ancillary benefit of reducing coal mine 
 
exempts some new wells—including low-pressure wells, exploratory 
wells, and delineation wells—from the rule’s requirements. EPA said it 
is technologically infeasible to use REC at low-pressure wells, which 
account for 10 percent of fracked wells.”). 
105. Bianco et al., supra note 79, at 15. 
106. For an overview of the Clean Air Act, see The Plain English Guide to 
the Clean Air Act: Understanding the Clean Air Act, EPA, http:// 
www.epa.gov/airquality/peg_caa/understand.html (last updated Mar. 
6, 2012). 
107. For ongoing updates on EPA and Mercury, see Mercury and Air Toxics 
Standards (MATS): Regulatory Actions, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/ 
mats/actions.html (last updated Mar. 28, 2013). See also Laws and 
Regulations: Mercury Regulations and Standards, EPA, http://epa.gov/ 
hg/regs.htm (last updated Mar. 29, 2013) (“In December 2011, EPA 
issued the first national standards for mercury pollution from power 
plants. MATS are the first national standards to protect American 
families from power plant emissions of mercury and toxic air pollution like 
arsenic, acid gas, nickel, selenium, and cyanide. The standards will slash 
emissions of these dangerous pollutants by relying on widely available, 
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methane emissions that amounted roughly to 1 percent of U.S. 
greenhouse gas emissions in 2010,108 regulating VOCs can reduce 
natural gas emission impacts on climate change. The impact on 
human health from VOCs is more directly understood and 
attributable to natural gas systems. This perhaps explains why the 
EPA has sought to enact volatile organic compound rules for natural 
gas systems and has yet to directly regulate methane as a greenhouse 
gas.109 The EPA could also address coal mine natural gas emissions 
directly under section 111 of the Clean Air Act.  
In conjunction with federal incentives, state energy-climate-water 
laboratories can model different approaches to coordination to reduce 
greenhouse gases through energy innovations. State collaborative 
models include the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI),110 
while the California Assembly Bill 32111 and individual state renewable 
portfolio standards that twenty-nine states have established can be 
looked to as a threshold below which federal momentum on 
renewables and efficiency should not descend.112 It remains an open 
 
proven pollution controls that are already in use at more than half of the 
nation’s coal-fired power plants.”); National Emission Standards for 
Hazardous Air Pollutants from Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam 
Generating Units and Standards of Performance for Fossil-Fuel-Fired 
Electric Utility, Industrial-Commercial-Institutional, and Small Industrial-
Commercial-Institutional Steam Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 9304 
(Feb. 16, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60 and 63). 
108. Bianco et al., supra note 79, at 19. 
109. See Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs) in Commonly Used Products, 
N.Y. Dep’t of Health, http://www.health.ny.gov/environmental/ 
indoors/voc.htm (last updated Oct. 2012) (“Short-term exposure to high 
levels of some VOCs can cause headaches, dizziness, light-headedness, 
drowsiness, nausea, and eye and respiratory irritation. These effects 
usually go away after the exposure stops. In laboratory animals, 
longterm exposure to high levels of some VOCs has caused cancer and 
affected the liver, kidney and nervous system.”). 
110. See Program Design, Reg’l Greenhouse Gas Initiative, http:// 
www.rggi.org/design (last visited Apr. 3, 2013) (describing the RGGI as 
a multi-state cooperative aiming to reduce carbon dioxide emissions 
through the use of Budget Trading Programs). 
111. Signed into law on September 27, 2006, as the Global Warming Solutions 
Act of 2006, Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 38500–38599 (2006). 
112. See, e.g., State-Federal RPS Collaborative, Clean Energy States 
Alliance, http://www.cleanenergystates.org/projects/state-federal-rps-
collaborative (last visited Apr. 3, 2013) (“Renewable portfolio standards 
are an important tool that 29 states have established to encourage clean 
energy investment in the U.S.”); U.S. Energy Info. Admin., A Clean 
Energy Standard Could Reduce Power Sector Carbon Dioxide 
Emissions, Today in Energy (May 4, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/ 
todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=6130 (discussing reductions of carbon 
dioxide emissions under clean energy standards). 
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question as to what degree the hydraulic fracturing revolution has 
impeded state-federal cooperative federalism capacity to meet and 
implement renewable portfolio standards. We need more than rhetoric 
to facilitate a transition to renewables and greater efficiency. Federal 
power is powerful in the energy context.113 Federalism comes in many 
shapes and sizes (for example, national speed limits and federal lights-
out decrees).114 Similarly, states and substate governments can utilize 
 
113. For the importance of federal power, see The Federalist No. 45 (James 
Madison) (discussing the importance of the public good); Robin Kundis 
Craig, Constitutional Contours for the Design and Implementation of 
Multistate Renewable Energy Programs and Projects, 81 U. Colo. L. 
Rev. 771, 780–81 (2010) (discussing Congress’s authority over energy and 
the Commerce Clause); Oliver A. Houck & Michael Rolland, Federalism 
in Wetlands Regulation: A Consideration of Delegation of Clean Water 
Act Section 404 and Related Programs to the States, 54 Md. L. Rev. 
1242, 1244 (1995) (discussing a strong federal role in the contest of 
wetlands while recognizing the importance of active state partnership). 
For other environmental federalism perspectives, see Robert V. Percival, 
Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary Models, 
54 Md. L. Rev. 1141, 1171–72 (1995) (discussing models of environ-
mental federalism and the factors that have contributed to the 
federalization of environmental regulation). See also Ann E. Carlson, 
Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1097, 
1139–41 (2009) (discussing how environmental iterative federalism can 
optimize collective decision-making); Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the 
Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 Emory L.J. 
159, 175–77 (2006) (considering the dimensions of dynamic environmental 
federalism); Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A Collective Action 
Perspective on Ceiling Preemption by Federal Environmental Regulation: 
The Case of Global Climate Change, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 579, 593–602 
(2008) (considering collective action in the context of climate 
coordination); Patricia E. Salkin & Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Cooperative 
Federalism and Wind: A New Framework for Achieving Sustainability, 37 
Hofstra L. Rev. 1049, 1051–52 (2009) (discussing federal limits to state 
siting restrictions on wind power); Benjamin K. Sovacool, The Best of 
Both Worlds: Environmental Federalism and the Need for Federal Action 
on Renewable Energy and Climate Change, 27 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 397 
(2008) (proposing a model of interactive federalism including national 
floors and climate change quotas); Amy L. Stein, The Tipping Point of 
Federalism, 45 Conn. L. Rev. 217, 231 n.52 (2012) (“One argument is 
that ‘the federal government is well-equipped to provide capital-intensive 
services like the construction of deep salt-lined storage facilities for high-
level nuclear waste, but is likely to be inept at conducting labor-intensive 
services like the management of public hearings to minimize public 
opposition to waste sites.’” (quoting Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political 
Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense 
and ‘Dual Sovereignty’ Doesn’t, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 813, 869–79 (1998))). 
114. See Stein, supra note 113, at 222 n.14 (“In response to the 1973 Oil 
Embargo, Congress passed the 1974 Emergency Highway Energy 
Conservation Act that established a national speed limit only to repeal 
the law over twenty years later to tip power back to the states.”); see 
also France: Countrywide ‘Lights Out’ Measure Aims to Save Energy, 
EEnews Greenwire (Feb. 1, 2013), http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire 
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the state police powers to strengthen state and local building codes 
mindful of climate-energy-water synergies. Within the realm of health, 
safety, morals, and general welfare lies a realm of state governance 
capacity that can fold into federal and non-state actor initiatives. 
Utilizing this capacity can perhaps allow us to forgo lengthy and 
resource-consuming efforts to hash out federal and individual rights 
that often overlap with state and substate interests in protecting 
health, safety, morals, and general welfare. 
Efficiency improvements in residential, commercial, and industrial 
systems provide greenhouse gas benefits by reducing demand for fossil 
fuels. States have already begun implementing efficiency measures that 
reduce demand for natural gas by decreasing the need to heat.115 State 
and local governments in the United States have traditionally incentiv-
ized building improvements through such instruments as building 
codes,116 and this may be the best way of reducing the 7 percent of U.S. 
emissions attributable to commercial and residential heating—largely 
natural gas combustion for heating, cooking, and water heating.117 
Unlike many energy efficiency measures, combined heat and 
power (CHP) can increase energy diversity and security through 
cogeneration, but by its very nature it presents trade-offs as 
distributed power generation in close proximity to customers brings 
waste byproducts as well as beneficial waste heat.118 States can help 
 
/2013/02/01/26 (“Commercial buildings in France will have to turn off 
their lights as part of a government decree issued this week. The 
measure requires the interior lights of shops and offices to be turned off 
an hour after the last worker leaves. Lights on storefronts and shop 
windows must be shut off by 1 a.m. The Eiffel Tower and other major 
attractions will be allowed to keep lights turned on during the night. 
Delphine Batho, France’s environment minister, said the country aims 
to be a ‘pioneer’ in reducing light pollution. In a statement, she said the 
law, part of a larger initiative to increase energy efficiency and cut back 
on waste, would also reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 250,000 tons a 
year. Batho also said the measure would improve public health, adding 
that artificial lighting can affect sleep patterns and the ecosystem.”). 
115. See Bianco et al., supra note 79, at 78–83. 
116. Id. at 81–83. 
117. Id. at 19.  
118. See U.S. Energy Info. Admin, Combined Heat and Power Technology 
Fills an Important Energy Niche, Today in Energy (Oct. 4, 2012), 
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=8250 (“CHP systems 
operate with a wide range of fuels. Natural gas, however, is the most 
common primary energy source used in combined heat and power 
stations, followed by coal and biomass (often in the form of waste 
products at paper mills). Over 65% of CHP capacity currently operating 
in the United States is using natural gas as a primary fuel 
source . . . .”); see also Saqib Rahim, Billions Needed to Immunize Oil 
and Gas tech from Attacks—Report, EEnews EnergyWire (Jan. 30, 
2013), http://www.eenews.net/energywire/rss/2013/01/30/3 (“Modern 
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balance incentives for microgrids and distribute power through such 
instruments as net metering,119 while also implementing output-based 
air pollution regulations.120 Generally, natural gas mitigation 
technologies can pay for themselves within several years without a 
price on carbon because capturing natural gas generally increases the 
amount of natural gas available for sale.121 This is not necessarily the 
case in North Dakota where infrastructure is sparse and transporting 
natural gas remains expensive. 
The following chart shows the first reported natural gas systems 
emissions from highest-emitting state to lowest-emitting state.122 
Looking at the fourth column, a comparison can be made among states 
with high natural gas system emissions and renewable portfolio 
standards.123 
 
computing has made that infrastructure ever more sophisticated, with 
sensors and controls increasingly tied into the company’s internal 
network. It makes for a leaner operation, but it’s opened up new doors 
for cybercriminals.”). 
119. See New York: Incentives/Policies for Renewables and Efficiency, 
Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, 
http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm?Incentive_Code=NY
05R (last updated Nov. 12, 2012) (explaining the net-metering incentive 
for New York); Net Energy Metering (NEM), California Pub. Util. 
Commission, http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/DistGen/netmeteri 
ng.htm (last updated Jan. 9, 2013) (“Customers who install small solar, 
wind, biogas, and fuel cell generation facilities (1 MW or less) to serve all 
or a portion of onsite electricity needs are eligible for the state’s net 
metering program. NEM allows a customer-generator to receive a financial 
credit for power generated by their onsite system and fed back to the 
utility. The credit is used to offset the customer’s electricity bill.”). 
120. Bianco et al., supra note 79, at 84. 
121. Id. at 50 (“Our middle-of-the-road scenario assumes that EPA implements 
regulations that require natural gas systems to employ the above 
emissions control technologies—as well as conversion of existing highbleed 
pneumatic controllers to low-bleed or no-bleed controllers—to reduce 
emissions from processing and transmission. This technology is predicted 
to have a payback period of less than two years with a $20 price on 
carbon, and is projected to pay for itself within three years even without a 
price on carbon. . . . Our go-getter scenario assumes that EPA implements 
regulations that require natural gas systems to employ all of the emission 
control technologies identified in the lackluster and middle-of-the-road 
scenarios, as well as: 1. Hot taps to reduce emissions from pipeline 
maintenance and repair during transmission; 2. Desiccant dehydrators to 
reduce emissions during dehydration of wet gas; 3. Improved compressor 
maintenance to reduce emissions during processing; and 4. Vapor recovery 
units to reduce emissions during storage.”). 
122. 2011 Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Large Facilities, supra note 76.  
123. Renewable Portfolio Standard Policies, Database of State 
Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency (Mar. 2013), http:// 
www.dsireusa.org/documents/summarymaps/RPS_map.pdf. 
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Table 3: States with the Highest Petroleum and Natural Gas Emissions, 
2011124 
State 
 
Emissions 
(million tons CO2e) 
Sites125 
 
Mandatory RPS or non-binding 
Renewable Portfolio Goal
Texas 23 285 5,880 MW by 2015 
Louisiana 16 204    
Alaska 12 28    
Wyoming 11 77    
California 10 62 20% (33%) by 2010 (2020) 
New Mexico 6.8 47 20% by 2020 
Illinois 6.0 30 25% by 2025 
Colorado 5.8 71 30% by 2020 
Oklahoma 3.7 68 15% by 2015 (goal) 
Pennsylvania 3.1 49 18% by 2021 
Alabama 2.6 29 
Arkansas 2.4 58    
Michigan 2.1 24 10% by 2015 
Kansas 2.0 36 20% by 2020 
Mississippi 1.9 34 
New York 1.9 19 29% by 2015 
Indiana 1.8 23 10% by 2025 (goal) 
North Dakota 1.5 22 10% by 2015 (goal) 
Ohio 1.3 17 12.50% by 2025 
West Virginia 1.2 20 25% by 2025 (goal) 
Utah 1.1 21 20% by 2025 (goal) 
New Jersey 1.0 8 20.38% by 2021 
Washington 0.96 9 15% by 2020 
Florida 0.84 15    
Georgia 0.76 8    
Iowa 0.73 19 105 MW 
Minnesota 0.73 12 25% by 2025 
South Dakota 0.73 1 10% by 2015 (goal) 
 
124. Based on the charts from 2011 Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Large 
Facilities, supra note 76; Renewable Portfolio Standard Policies, supra 
note 123. 
125. “Sites” are the number of facilities in the petroleum and natural gas 
industry that emit over 25,000 metric tons of greenhouse gases per year 
and are therefore required to report emissions to the EPA. 
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Missouri 0.72 9 15% by 2021 
Virginia 0.72 11 15% by 2025 (goal) 
Kentucky 0.68 15    
Massachusetts 0.65 7 15% by 2020 
Tennessee 0.64 12 
Arizona 0.55 16 15% by 2025 
Maryland 0.54 6 20% by 2022 
North Carolina 0.53 8 12.50% by 2021 
Nebraska 0.39 6    
Connecticut 0.35 7 27% by 2020 
Oregon 0.29 6 25% by 2025 
Nevada 0.29 5 25% by 2025 
Idaho 0.27 9 
Montana 0.27 10 15% by 2015 
New Hampshire 0.23 1 24.80% by 2025 
South Carolina 0.21 3    
Rhode Island 0.18 2 16% by 2020 
Wisconsin 0.13 5 10% by 2015 
Delaware 0.034 2 25% by 2026 
Hawaii 0.032 2 40% by 2030 
Maine 0.031 2 10%126 by 2017127  
Vermont 0.0 0 20% by 2017 
District of Columbia 0.0 0 20% by 2020 
 
It is important to emphasize that the above reported numbers do 
not account for methane emissions from soil. To date, the scientific 
literature has focused on wellhead leaks, but methane emissions from 
the ground also significantly contribute to climate change.128 While 
geological variations may impact the leakage of methane from soil, 
ignoring this category renders a comparison between natural gas and 
coal, or any other fuel, premature and inaccurate. Australian 
researcher Isaac Santos explains that infrastructure leakage is a more 
 
126. New renewable resources; existing RPS is 30% and has been since 2000. 
127. Increasing 1% every year for ten years, until reaching 10% by 2017. 
128. Michael Slezak, Methane Leaks Suggest Fracking Benefits Exaggerated, 
New Scientist (Nov. 21, 2012), available at http://www.newscientist. 
com/article/dn22521-methane-leaks-suggest-fracking-benefits-exaggerat 
ed.html (noting that Damien Maher found higher levels of methane in 
the air above the Australian Tara gas field). 
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straightforward fix than methane seeping from the soil.129 
Unfortunately, easy metrics are not the objective. Cradle-to-grave 
natural gas system reporting, including soil, may require multi-variant 
analyses, but can be recognized as part of the iterative obligation 
under the UNFCCC to report and implement climate mitigation. At 
the federal level in the United States, the EPA should not only 
require direct natural gas emissions reports from entities over the 
25,000 metric ton CO2e threshold, but also coordinate aggregate 
accurate information generation of life cycle natural gas system 
methane emissions with other federal entities such as the Bureau of 
Land Management. Together, these federal pieces in the larger 
energy-climate-water coordination challenge can work with tribes, 
states, counties, cities, towns, and other jurisdictions in cooperative 
ways to put in place best practices. To my mind, identifying and 
implementing these best practices can best be achieved through 
innovative governance with relevant non-state actors—not only those 
with drilling expertise, but those with health and ecosystem expertise. 
Methane mitigation insight generation and oversight challenges 
can vary substantially by context. To give but one example, the 
capacity of plunger lifts to reduce methane emissions by 40 percent 
may not have been public knowledge, but through coordination 
among natural gas developers and environmental nongovernmental 
organizations, it is becoming a better known best practice. 
Cooperative EPA, state, and local requirements to implement plunger 
lift technology directly would exemplify innovative governance in the 
methane mitigation context. Since future technologies may displace 
plunger lift technology as a best practice, adaptive governance should 
work with state and non-state expertise (industry, social, and 
environmental) to incentivize evolving best practices. 
A broader accounting of natural gas emissions should also include 
responsibility to fix leaking pipelines. A joint Boston University and 
Duke University study mapped significant natural gas emissions from 
worn out pipeline infrastructure under Boston. This study concludes 
that “[r]epairing leaky natural gas distribution systems will reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions, increase consumer health and safety, and 
save money.”130 Boston is not the only jurisdiction contending with 
 
129. Id. 
130. Nathan G. Phillips et al., Mapping Urban Pipeline Leaks: Methane 
Leaks Across Boston, 173 Envtl. Pollution 1 (2013), available at 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0269749112004800. 
The study mapped methane leaks across the entire 785 road miles in the 
city of Boston, identifying 3,356 methane leaks with concentrations 
exceeding up to 15 times the global background level and methane 
isotopic signatures that strongly indicate a fossil fuel source rather than 
a biogenic source (e.g., wetlands). Id. See also Anne C. Mulkern, 
Numerous Problems put Pipelines at Risk for Break, Explosion–Report, 
EEnews Greenwire (Mar. 15, 2012), http://www.eenews.net/Green 
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methane emissions via leaking natural gas pipelines.131 I derived Table 
3 from an interactive EPA website that was designed to provide local 
air quality information since volatile organic compounds are a smog 
precursor. The EPA now has metrics with which to assess where leaky 
pipes and other old residential heating infrastructure play a larger role 
than unconventional natural gas extraction. 
It is important to determine whether emissions are attributed to 
the states where natural gas is extracted or to the states where the 
natural gas is used by customers to heat homes or run electrical 
appliances. The EPA may be best positioned to incentivize reporting 
and implementation of methane capture from leaky pipelines—which 
have the same effect as venting natural gas directly from wellheads. 
The EPA may also be able to coordinate with states and substate 
counterparts to incentivize natural gas intermediate and end use 
methane mitigation. Here, folding methane into RGGI efficiency and 
methane reduction approaches that then link to other cap and trade 
systems may be able to reduce methane emissions through aggregate 
market processes in a more effective manner than government efforts 
to aggregate such diffuse information at the residential level across 
whole regions. That being said, local land use decision makers that 
contribute sustainable building code updates could substantially drive 
down methane emissions through efficiency and better building 
materials and methodologies. In other words, life cycle natural gas 
mitigation may be most effectively achieved by linking natural gas 
systems into broader cap and trade climate mitigation, mindful of the 
dependency of such programs on transparency. 
Venting natural gas before or after well preparation appears to still 
present a transparency challenge of unknown, but knowable dimen-
sions, if regulations were to be expanded to methane emissions across 
the natural gas life cycle. Burning methane as fully as possible increases 
the transfer of methane to carbon dioxide, which is a substantial 
greenhouse gas contributor in its own right, but less potent than 
 
wire/rss/2012/03/15/3 (“Old plastic pipes, poor record-keeping, un-
authorized digging and a host of other problems put natural gas 
pipelines at risk for rupture and explosion, the California Public Utilities 
Commission said yesterday.”). 
131.  E.g., Juliet Eilperin, Natural Gas Leaks Come Under Scrutiny, Raise 
Questions on Climate Impact, Wash. Post, Mar. 3, 2013, http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/natural-gas-leaks-come-under-
scrutiny-raise-questions-on-climate-impact/2013/03/03/23d1e0d4-7f88-11e2-
b99e-6baf4ebe42df_story.html (“While aging infrastructure contributes to 
leaks, so does the fact that utilities in Boston and the District can pass 
on the full cost of unaccounted losses—whether through leaks or theft—
to customers. In the District, this charge makes up 3 percent of 
Washington Gas customers’ monthly costs; in Boston it represents 
1 percent of residents’ monthly bill, the companies say.”). 
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methane. Burning natural gas, which is primarily methane, produces 
less carbon dioxide than burning coal, but methane has a greenhouse 
heating effect over twenty times greater than that of CO2, so 
substantial methane leaks could entirely counter the benefits increased 
natural gas use. Due to the vast reserves of natural gas now recoverable 
through unconventional methods and made more profitable by recent 
technological and legal developments, energy momentum has veered in 
the direction of maximizing natural gas extraction. The effect on 
renewables appears to be a negative one, raising the question of 
whether market intervention should be undertaken by the public sector. 
The trade-offs are public health and ecosystem services that can be 
gained by protecting public goods to air and water versus economic 
stimulation, energy access, and private property rights benefited from a 
thin legal mantel over natural gas development. 
We do not know what we are consuming. Only since 2011 have 
we begun to look at aggregate oil and natural gas data by state, and 
are now able to pinpoint geographical locations of sources and 
suppliers. We have yet to coordinate robust life cycle analysis that 
parses out why some traditional oil and gas states have low emissions, 
while states that do not feature largely in the hydraulic fracturing 
debate have surprisingly high emissions. Further elements in a matrix, 
beyond direct methane emissions and renewable portfolio standards, 
could involve a vulnerability ranking by state. Whether within the 
same or a new category, some assessment of disaster locations could 
be illuminating. Here it would be important to differentiate among 
rapid-onset disasters such as Katrina and Sandy versus slow-onset 
disasters such as extreme drought.132 Do declarations of disaster 
jurisdictions correlate with subsequent climate sensitivities, leading to 
greater incentivizing of a shift from fossil fuels to renewables? Another 
element in a climate-energy-water matrix that could be useful to 
mapping the evolving sustainability challenge is tracking the 
industry’s degree of good-faith reporting of methane emissions 
through neutral, infrared monitoring. It would also be useful to map 
which states rely to a greater degree on oil, coal, natural gas, 
geothermal, hydro, nuclear, and renewables. While most decision 
makers have a general sense of heating differentials based on northern 
states’ winter temperatures being lower than those further south, 
recent warmer winters and summers have had a ripple effect, 
 
132. See, e.g., Disaster Declarations, FEMA, http://www.fema.gov/disasters 
(last visited Apr. 3, 2013) (distinguishing between types of severe 
disasters); see also Elizabeth Burleson, Field Notes from the SuperStorm 
Sandy Catastrophe, 37 Colum. J. Envtl. L. (forthcoming 2013) 
(discussing the large-scale impact of sudden onset Super-Storm Sandy); 
Elizabeth Burleson, Climate Change Displacement to Refuge, 25 J. 
Envtl. L. & Litig. 19 (2010) (discussing how climate change and 
weather disasters impact migration patterns and refugees). 
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impacting energy supply and demand cycles as the climate becomes 
more unpredictable from season to season and year to year. 
In addition to demand-end elements broken down by state, 
mapping supply infrastructure could also illuminate where states have 
greater capacity to bring natural gas to market without flaring. The 
low natural gas emissions reported by Texas in the above chart likely 
results, at least in part, from its existing extensive pipeline and 
refinery infrastructure—but it would be useful to differentiate where 
existing infrastructure plays the major role in averting flaring versus 
where gas development is happening by emitters producing under the 
25,000 metric ton CO2e threshold or emitting in ways that are 
indirect and thus not covered by current reporting requirements. 
Given U.S. federal capacity, the EPA is well positioned to 
coordinate further information gathering that could flesh out these 
elements of climate-energy-water governance innovation. With 
enhanced reporting and implementation requirements to reduce 
methane emissions throughout the natural gas lifecycle, the U.S. 
federal government can cooperatively facilitate the balancing of 
energy access and oversight with civil society, industry, 
municipalities, tribes, and states.  
B. North Dakota Leads the United States in Growth  
at What Cost to Climate? 
Every day North Dakota flares natural gas that could heat half a 
million homes for a day.133 While natural gas developers in the 
Marcellus Shale region go to great lengths to reach the gas,134 
developers in North Dakota’s Bakken prefer the higher revenue 
stream of crude oil and are treating the gas as waste. It is not clear 
whether this approach will also occur in other states as natural gas 
 
133. Andrew C. Revkin & Clifford Krauss, A Cheap, Easy Way to Curb 
Climate Change: Seal the Gas Leaks, N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 2009, at A1 
(“For the EPA and environmental scientists, the challenge is convincing 
gas and oil producers here and abroad that efforts to avoid such releases 
often more than pay for themselves. The use of infrared cameras is 
expanding as word spreads of the payoff in saved gas.”). 
134. See Janice Crompton, Flares from Marcellus Shale Wells Attracting 
Plenty of Attention, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, (Feb. 2, 2012, 12:00 
AM), http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/12033/1207351-59.stm (detailing 
the process by which gas is reached and the reasons for using flares); 
Tensions Flicker over Marcellus Flaring, EEnews Greenwire (Feb. 7, 
2012), http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/rss/2012/02/07/17 (“Flaring 
occurs after the hydraulic fracturing process to test the well. It is also 
used to release pressure before production begins. The process takes about 
three days.”); Anna Driver & Bruce Nichols, Shale Oil Boom Sends Waste 
Gas Burn-Off Soaring, Reuters (July 25, 2011, 2:18 PM), http:// 
www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/25/us-shale-flaring-idUSTRE76O4SU20 
110725 (noting that flaring of natural gas substantially adds to global 
warming). 
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prices sink and oil prices remain high. The more remote the well, the 
harder it is to connect it to existing natural gas pipelines—a problem 
that has increased as hydraulic fracturing expands into new areas. 
The U.S. Energy Information Administration explains:  
The North Dakota Department of Mineral Resources estimated 
that in May 2011, nearly 36% of the natural gas produced did 
not make it to market. Most of this gas—29% of the total gas 
produced—was flared. The remaining natural gas that did not 
make it to market—7% of total gas produced—is unaccounted 
for or lost, which means the gas may have been used as lease 
and plant fuel, or encountered losses during processing or 
transportation. . . .  
According to current North Dakota state regulations, producers 
can flare natural gas for one year without paying taxes or 
royalties on it, and can ask for an extension on that period due 
to economic hardship of connecting the well to a natural gas 
pipeline. After one year, or when the extension runs out, 
producers can continue flaring but are responsible for the same 
taxes and royalties they would have paid if the natural gas went 
to market.135 
For the United States, North Dakota flaring is an industry 
outlier, but a significant one in the context of climate stability. North 
Dakota’s relative remoteness does not mean it contributes less to 
climate destabilization—greenhouse gasses distribute evenly in the 
atmosphere. Michael Webber, of the University of Texas Center for 
International Energy and Environmental Policy, notes that “North 
Dakota is not as bad as Kazakhstan, but this is not what you would 
expect a civilized, efficient society to do: to flare off a perfectly good 
product just because it’s expensive to bring to market.”136 If Bakken 
drillers cannot afford to do something more productive with the 
natural gas that they are extracting than flare, then the public sector 
should intervene to fix this market failure and increase the value of 
methane emission mitigation. 
 
135. Over One-Third of Natural Gas Produced in North Dakota Is Flared or 
Otherwise Not Marketed, supra note 43; see also Julia Sklar, Gas Flares 
from Bakken Fracking are Visible from Space, New Scientist (Jan. 28, 
2013, 5:20 PM), http://www.newscientist.com/blogs/shortsharpscience/ 
2013/01/julia-sklar-reporter.html (“[A] town with a different kind of 
night-life. One of the bright regions that sits alone in the darkness of the 
northern plains isn’t a bustling city at all—instead, this blaze is a night-
time view of fracking in action. Seen in this photo taken by NASA’s 
Suomi NPP satellite, the glow comes from hundreds of flares from rigs 
drilled into the Bakken formation of North Dakota.”). 
136. Revkin & Krauss, supra note 133. 
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Even if the United States is unlikely to directly alter the price of 
natural gas, it can indirectly alter the price of polluting the 
atmosphere with what drillers perceive to be excess natural gas. High 
oil prices combined with short, five-year leases to drill in the Bakken 
have the oil and gas industry acting wastefully with regard to the 
long-term value of natural gas and climate stability. The last time the 
federal government addressed flaring was when it required Alaska 
North Slope reinjection rather than flaring in the 1970s. If remote 
Saskatchewan can enact flaring standards,137 then states like North 
Dakota can coordinate with the federal government to effectively end 
large-scale flaring. Coordination can also include such companies as 
Whiting, given its experience reducing flaring from 80 to 20 percent 
by building gas plants.138 Solution generation does not need to be as 
one dimensional as piping gas to distant markets. It does not require 
siting new natural gas plants per se. Innovating other ways to either 
put the methane back underground or use it more responsibly can 
occur through state and non-state networks committed to genuine 
climate stabilization. 
Locating entities that could soak up demand could work both as a 
solution and a way of bringing natural gas to areas in need of it. Since 
neither of these two ideas is likely to be implemented quickly, 
reinjecting and powering operations should be seriously considered, as 
they could be done without substantial additional infrastructure by 
creating regulations that incentivize industry internalization of the 
methane contribution to climate destabilization. 
Over the course of a single year, North Dakota’s flaring has 
contributed at least two million tons of carbon dioxide toward climate 
destabilization.139 While a few pipelines are underway to connect some 
wells, the Bakken oil field encompasses 18,000 square miles and is not 
 
137. See Memo from Todd H. Han, Director, Petrol. Dev. Branch, Ministry 
of Energy & Res., Sask., to Sask. Well and Facility Licensees, regarding 
Introduction of Directive S-10, Saskatchewan Upstream Petroleum 
Industry Associated Gas Conservation Directive and Directive S-20, 
Saskatchewan Upstream Flaring and Incineration Requirements (June 
22, 2011), available at http://www.economy.gov.sk.ca/NTAO-S10-S20 
(announcing the introduction of new gas conservation standards). See 
generally Joshua P. Fershee, The Oil and Gas Evolution: Learning from 
the Hydraulic Fracturing Experiences in North Dakota and West 
Virginia, 19 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 23 (2012). 
138. David Fessler, Bakken Natural Gas Flaring: A Giant Step Backward or 
an Opportunity in Disguise?, Investment U. (Sept. 30, 2011), 
http://www.investmentu.com/2011/September/natural-gas-flaring.html. 
  
139. Jan Falstad, Gas to Greenbacks: Montanans Create Company to 
Capture, Sell Excess Bakken Gas, Billings Bus. (June 10, 2012, 12:10 
AM), http://billingsgazette.com/business/montanans-create-company 
-to-capture-sell-excess-bakken-gas/article_85e40396-3ae0-5cc1-8cf9- 
5b8e8fbce30b.html. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 4·2013 
Climate Change and Natural Gas Dynamic Governance 
1263 
recognized as a productive natural gas play despite its ability to be 
liquefied.140 To my mind, North Dakota is in a position to incentivize 
green technology that captures natural gas. This can be done through 
banning flaring just as Nigeria has done, albeit with insufficient 
enforcement. It can be done through a state renewable portfolio 
standard that factors flaring reduction into a target flexibility 
mechanism. This could be achieved by linking cap and trade programs 
to put a price on greenhouse gas emissions, or it could be done by 
taxing greenhouse gas emissions.141 As this article goes to press, North 
Dakota Govenor Jack Dalrymple has signed legislation that offers oil 
producers tax breaks in exchange for reducing natural gas flaring in 
the northwest part of the state.142 Generally, the new law seeks to 
incentivize wells over one year old to stop flaring and either be 
capped or connected to a gas gathering line. It remains an open 
question the degree to which oil producers will make use of the new 
rule’s inclusion of an exemption request to the state’s industrial 
commission based on economic infeasibility.143 
In the governance gap that has led to excessive North Dakota 
flaring, entrepreneurial innovators have seen an independent economic 
opportunity “creating wealth from a waste stream.”144 An initiative 
called G2G has a trailer gas liquefying service that leaves the well 
owner with the end product to use or sell. Since methane requires a 
great deal of pressure to liquefy, G2G has been using methane to 
power the process of liquefying other gasses. Rather than flaring, 
there are markets for propane, butane, and natural gasoline that can 
be separated from the natural gas, which in and of itself, has been a 
valuable home heating fuel. Flaring is shortsighted given the greater 
 
140. Id. 
141. See Mike Ellerd, PN Bakken: Legislation Provides Incentives for Gas 
Flaring Alternatives, Petroleum News Bakken (Jan. 20, 2013), 
http://www.petroleumnews.com/pntruncate/237468870.shtml (“House 
bill 1134 identifies additional alternatives to keep gas from ‘going up in 
flames,’ and offers tax incentives to reduce flaring.”). 
142. Mark Wolski, Drilling: North Dakota Governor Signs Bill Offering Tax 
Breaks to Reduce Gas Flares, 85 Daily Env’t Rep. (BNA) A-6 (May 5, 
2013), available at http://news.bna.com/deln/DELNWB/split_display. 
adp?fedfid=30888938&vname=dennotallissues&jd=a0d8c5m5u3 (“The 
bill (H.B. 1134), which was signed April 26, exempts tangible personal 
property used to collect natural gas from wells from the state's sales tax, 
while also exempting natural gas collected from oil wells from the gross 
production tax.”). 
143.  Information on North Dakota’s H.B. 1134, which becomes effective July 
1, 2013, is available at http://www.legis.nd.gov/assembly/63-2013/bill-
index/bi1134.html. 
144. Falstad, supra note 139 (“Depending on the well, G2G’s technology can 
capture up to three-fourths of the natural gas liquids and provide 
another revenue source for well and mineral rights owners.”). 
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value of cogeneration of electricity combining plentiful natural gas 
and wind power. This need not rely entirely on electrical wires for 
transmission infrastructure given the possible option to use the 
Missouri and other rivers for energy storage. Hydro-wind-natural gas 
cogeneration could innovatively power the region with sufficient 
public-private investment and coordination. 
When I taught energy law in the Dakotas, my students and I 
submitted comments for a hydro-wind tribal proposal on the Missouri 
River that was initiated by the Energy Policy Act of 2005.145 Teaching 
energy, water, climate, property, international, intertribal, environ-
mental law in the Dakotas taught me to appreciate constant wind and 
deepened my understanding of the energy and political spectrum. 
Softball sized hail and forty below temperatures did not deter me 
from spending significant time enjoying the night sky—a distinct 
contrast from the often too light skies with which I had grown up. I 
am reminded of a ten-year-old child from New York City who once 
asked me what all the spots in the night sky were. Unlike this child 
from Harlem, I did know what stars were. The opportunity to see 
such bright stars, however, is well worth lingering in the Dakotas to 
appreciate. During the northeast power outage of 2003 and increasing 
power outages since, neighbors congregate on sofa cushions in my 
Connecticut backyard, and we point out constellations that ordinarily 
one would have to drive significantly further north than NYC 
commuter land to have seen well. Light pollution has long been 
appreciated by astronomers and recently recognized as harmful by 
medical professionals studying sleep patterns.146 If all that resulted 
from flaring was light pollution, perhaps the trade-off of a striking 
Dakota sky would be seen as a luxury vis-à-vis energy access and 
economic stimulation. Yet light pollution is not the only ramification 
of flaring. We understand greenhouse gases well enough to render it 
short sighted to flare on this scale. 
It is hard to want to suffer being above or below an individual 
temperature comfort zone to reduce greenhouse gases collectively, 
 
145. W. Area Power Admin., Wind/Hydro Feasibility Study 
(WHFS) 1 (2007), available at http://www.wapa.gov/ugp/power 
marketing/windhydro/FINAL%20WHFS%20WorkPlan%2011_05.pdf 
(“The Energy Policy Act of 2005, Sec. 2606, required a study be 
performed by the Department of Energy (DOE) involving wind-hydro 
integration. Western Area Power Administration (Western) was tasked 
by DOE to perform a study of cost and feasibility to develop a 
demonstration project that uses wind energy generated on Indian Tribal 
lands and Federal hydroelectric power generated on the Missouri River 
to supply firming power to Western to meet its contractual 
obligations.”). 
146. Denise Winterman, Light Pollution: Is There a Solution?, BBC News 
Mag. (Jan. 17, 2012, 8:53 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-
16470744. 
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when corporations are irresponsibly venting and flaring natural gas at 
rates visible on NASA satellite nighttime images of locations such as 
North Dakota’s Bakken Play. This collective action problem has been 
written about with regard to Harden’s sheep, forestry and fishery 
management, sulfur dioxide impacts on acid rain, and the broad 
economic literature on the prisoner’s dilemma and free riding. Free 
riding connotes inaction that benefits from the efforts of others. Yet, 
flaring is an active black eye in U.S. efforts to respond effectively to 
climate change. This is not a complex problem lacking a technical 
solution. It is an economic calculation of revenue maximization absent 
a clear price on greenhouse gases and their externality impacts 
ranging from Super Storms on the scale of Sandy to continental 
droughts.  
Since negative externalities to the global atmospheric commons 
are not internalized in the cost of natural gas development, wells that 
are not close to pipelines and unlikely to be hooked up, and wells that 
are hooked up but have encountered pipelines that are full, have 
limited but viable alternatives to monetize the natural gas rather than 
flare roughly 30 percent of production. Given the scale of flaring, 
market adjustment should be occurring. For instance, fertilizer 
production does not require extensive pipeline infrastructure and can 
greatly benefit from low natural gas prices. If a fertilizer renaissance 
can ramp up and down with the swings in North Dakota isolated 
natural gas availability, it could help respond to growing demand for 
increased fertilizer. Utilizing a gas glut is not a roller coaster ride that 
all market participants are interested in, but those with sufficient 
flexibility could benefit greatly from low material costs and high 
fertilizer demand. Given a constrained national budget, it is worth 
questioning whether the dead zone in the Gulf of Mexico that has 
been created largely due to fertilizer runoff should have offset the July 
2012 decision by the North Dakota Department of Commerce to 
award the Northern Corn Development Corporation $100,000 to bring 
online a fertilizer sector to sop up a natural gas glut and avert 
Bakken flaring.147 While a broad debate has occurred over biofuels and 
 
147. John Kemp, Fertilizer Could Provide Solution to Bakken Flaring, 
Reuters (Sept. 26, 2012, 7:26 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
2012/09/26/us-column-kemp-usfertiliser-idUSBRE88P0P620120926 
(“Nitrogen is an essential part of all plant and animal proteins. While a 
few crops such as peas and soybeans can ‘fix’ nitrogen directly from the 
air, most, including wheat and corn, rely on nitrogen uptake from the 
soil from decomposing animal and plant waste or commercially produced 
fertilizers. . . . [N]itrogen-base fertilizers are [generally] produced by 
reacting nitrogen from the air with hydrogen sourced from natural gas 
to produce ammonia. . . . The world’s biggest producers last year were 
China (41 million metric tonnes by nitrogen content), India (12 million 
metric tonnes)[,] Russia (11 million metric tonnes)[,] and the United 
States (8.1 million metric tonnes).”). 
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food security, fewer members of the general public are aware that 
fertilizer prices track natural gas prices given that natural gas 
represents 80 to 90 percent of fertilizer production costs.148 
Coordination between states and non-states can help flesh out the 
relative merits of flaring vis-à-vis alternative uses of natural gas as 
well as innovate break out energy access solutions through 
collaboration not only in research but also in commercialization stages 
of the innovation process. 
The standard use of natural gas is to pipe it to businesses and 
residences for heat and cooking fuel. Life-cycle analysis that compares 
natural gas to both traditional and renewable energy sources need to 
remain mindful that electricity is not the only use for natural gas—no 
matter how convenient a metric electricity provides in conducting life-
cycle analyses. It is useful to have apples and apples at the end of the 
calculation, but not if doing so requires ignoring an end use on the 
scale of natural gas home heating which has nothing to do with 
electricity for many consumers. 
That said, the United States needs robust and comprehensive life-
cycle analysis to overcome the gridlock that has been largely political 
for lack of enough information to engage in nuanced analytical 
dialogues. If the Keystone XL pipeline is built from western Canada 
to refineries on the U.S. Gulf Coast, then a portion of natural gas can 
be used to dilute the heavy bituminous crudes.149 Again, the reduction 
of flaring should not be the only consideration in incentivizing tar 
sand transport from Canada. Broader climate-energy-water 
considerations need to be analyzed in an economic-social-
environmental balancing that is mindful not only of the recent 
economic downturn but also social and environmental integrity. A 
chart or several charts making up an energy matrix would be very 
useful for the general public to be able to see the energy-water-climate 
intensity of tar sands at one end of the spectrum and perhaps wind or 
wave energy at the other end of the spectrum. Time has been wasted 
not gathering far more information with which to make informed 
decisions among cross-cutting issues. 
Until recently, the New Scientist would probably not be running 
articles with titles like Gas Flares from Bakken Fracking are Visible 
from Space.150 Yet sometimes a visual really does outweigh reports, 
particularly technical ones full of numbers about drilling mud and 
 
148. Id. 
149. While the Keystone XL pipeline has been embraced by some, others 
have been less eager about the possibility. See Dan Frosch, Last-Ditch 
Bid in Texas To Try to Stop Oil Pipeline, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 2012, 
at A14 (discussing the ongoing battle in Texas over the Keystone XL, 
noting TransCanada’s behavior and pushback from Texans). 
150. Sklar, supra note 135. 
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such. NASA’s Suomi NPP satellite image of the U.S. night sky is now 
spreading like wildfire across the Internet through mainstream and 
social media networks. One could be forgiven for thinking the bright 
light the size of metropolitan Boston was an enormous wildfire. But it 
is not. Flaring roughly a third of natural gas production has lit up 
North Dakota—a sight now within a click of a mouse for anyone with 
an Internet connection. Transparent it is—disinfecting sunlight it is 
not. The climate ramifications of such greenhouse gas emissions are 
only now being discussed as the general public starts putting the 
pieces of climate destabilization together. 
State incentives through fiscal carrots or sticks combined with 
mandatory standards can help industry internalize the costs of faulty 
equipment, corrosion in pipelines, loose valves, and other natural gas 
infrastructure weak links where methane emissions can be expected 
and should be minimized. 
Infrared lenses and satellites can help industry, regulators, and 
the general public see escaping methane.151 Rendering methane 
emissions a visible and targeted challenge can help incentivize 
methane capture. Through computer monitoring, BP was able to 
track well pressure and time plunger lift cycles, cutting measured 
methane emissions in half by 2004 and almost entirely by 2007. The 
costs were one third of the captured natural gas revenues. This 
approach cannot offset unsafe practices elsewhere in the production 
line, nor does it always address ground-to-sale-meter natural gas 
emission, but it can noticeably reduce methane leakage.152 
State departments of environment and natural resources, in North 
Dakota and elsewhere, are in a position to set emission floors above 
which drillers cannot exceed. Instead, unconventional natural gas 
plays are outstripping the pollution levels of major U.S. cities, and 
authorities are requesting that members of the general public stay 
inside. “I don’t think we have to sell out our health for economic 
 
151. See, e.g., Car-Mounted Sensor Able to Pinpoint Sources of Natural Gas 
Leaks, Yale Env’t 360 (Dec. 14, 2012), http://e360.yale.edu/digest/car-
mounted_sensor_able_to_pinpoint_sources_of_natural_gas_leaks/3719/ 
(“A U.S.-based company has developed a sophisticated sensing technology 
capable of detecting and pinpointing the source of even minor natural gas 
leaks from great distances, an innovation that could provide critical 
insights into the still largely unknown climate impacts of natural gas 
drilling. . . . As natural gas drilling rapidly expands globally, driven by 
hydraulic fracturing technology, sophisticated methane detectors could 
provide important data on just how that drilling could contribute to 
climate change.”). 
152. See Revkin & Krauss, supra note 133, at A1 (“For the EPA and 
environmental scientists, the challenge is convincing gas and oil 
producers here and abroad that efforts to avoid such releases often more 
than pay for themselves. The use of infrared cameras is expanding as 
word spreads of the payoff in saved gas.”). 
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survival here. One shouldn’t be a tradeoff for the other,” according to 
Elaine Crumpley, a Wyoming environmentalist.153 The cost of 
polluting is as important as the cost of capturing emissions and 
internalizing environmental externalities that are shifted from private 
industry to the general public in the form of air and water 
contamination. State public sector regulations, taxes and subsidies, 
renewable portfolio standards, and cap and trade participation can 
help natural gas developers internalize the costs of production 
generally and justify up-front investments in methane mitigation in 
the face of competing capital costs and quarterly return timeframes 
for shareholder profit.154 
The next Section considers the role that non-state actors such as 
universities are playing in such dynamic governance. Professors at 
Cornell and elsewhere are struggling to come to terms with whether 
natural gas should become a bridging fuel.155 The Section considers 
some of the information that has emerged, and concludes that 
assumptions matter and dynamic governance coordination can 
facilitate closing the substantial information gap on natural gas 
climate impacts in relation to the full spectrum of energy options.  
C. University Innovation Leadership? 
Hydraulic fracturing and related unconventional natural gas 
development release significant methane emissions into the atmosphere. 
The main component of natural gas is the potent greenhouse gas 
methane. The greenhouse gas footprint of natural gas development 
includes “direct emissions of CO2 from end-use consumption, indirect 
emissions of CO2 from fossil fuels used to extract, develop, and 
transport the gas.”156 According to Cornell Professor Robert Howarth, 
Shale gas production is projected to rise from 16 percent of U.S. fuel 
 
153. Mead Gruver, Enviros Threaten to Sue EPA over Pollution in Gas 
Drilling Region, EEnews Greenwire (Oct. 4, 2011), http://www. 
eenews.net/Greenwire/rss/2011/10/04/20. 
154. See, e.g., Jean-Philippe Brisson, Stanford Renas & Daniel Firger, 
California’s Cap-and-Trade Regulations: Design Elements and 
Outstanding Issues, Bloomberg BNA (Dec. 23, 2011), http://news. 
bna.com/erln/ERLNWB/split_display.adp?fedfid=23904392&vname=er
notallissues&fn=23904392&jd=a0d0a9m5k3&split=0 (“[C]overed entities 
can meet up to 8 percent of their compliance obligation by surrendering 
CARB offset credits.”). 
155. See Robert W. Howarth & Anthony Ingraffea, Should Fracking Stop?, 
477 Nature 271 (2011), available at http://www.nature.com/nature/ 
journal/v477/n7364/abs/477271a.html (narrating the debate over whether 
fracking is too high risk of an activity to continue, or whether it is too 
valuable to stop). 
156. Robert W. Howarth, Renee Santoro & Anthony Ingraffea, Letter, 
Methane and the Greenhouse-Gas Footprint of Natural Gas from Shale 
Formations, 106 Climatic Change 679, 680 (2011). 
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production to 45 percent between 2009 and 2035.157 While natural gas 
does not have as concentrated byproducts as coal (for example, ash, 
mercury, sulfur, and other particulates),158 too “little is known about 
the [greenhouse gas] footprint of unconventional gas.”159 I argue that 
the national academies should be much more involved in mapping the 
impacts of hydraulic fracturing. This would provide highly credible 
information with which to make collective energy policy decisions 
across the complex array of energy sources.  
Already the National Research Council is on record for projecting 
that natural gas emissions could exceed conventional gas. A letter to 
President Obama from the Council of Scientific Society Presidents 
explains that unconventional natural gas extraction is not yet 
sufficiently understood to conclude whether its use will increase or 
decrease climate mitigation.160 While there is a broad international 
consensus that urgent energy policy shifts are requisite to mitigate 
greenhouse gas emissions, scientific consensus has yet to coalesce on 
the impacts of unconventional natural gas development vis-à-vis other 
energy options. 
Two recent academic studies on methane release from unconven-
tional natural gas extraction have reached opposite conclusions.161 
First and foremost, to my mind this indicates that the public sector 
should facilitate robust scientific study before further natural gas 
development proceeds. Second, faced with profound climate-energy-
water uncertainty, collective decision making should be inclusive, 
transparent, and representative in order to balance economic, social, 
and environmental needs and rights. 
With regard to the first priority, three core categories are 
important to understanding the greenhouse gas footprint of unconven-
tional natural gas development:  
1) Combustion of fossil fuels to drive the engines of the drills, 
pumps and compressors, etc, required to extract natural gas 
 
157. Id.  
158. Lawrence M. Cathles III et al., A Commentary on “The Greenhouse-
Gas Footprint of Natural Gas in Shale Formations” by R.W. Howarth, 
R. Santoro, and Anthony Ingraffea, 113 Climatic Change 525, 525 
(2012). 
159. Howarth, Santoro, & Ingraffea, supra note 156, at 680. 
160. Letter from Council of Scientific Soc’y Presidents to President Obama & 
Senior Admin. Officials (May 4, 2010), available at http://www.eeb.corne 
ll.edu/howarth/CCSP%20letter%20on%20energy%20&%20environment.pdf; 
Nat’l Research Council, Hidden Costs of Energy: Unpriced 
Consequences of Energy Production and Use (2010). 
161. Compare Howarth et al., supra note 156, with Cathles et al., supra note 
158.  
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onsite, and to transport equipment, resources and waste on 
and off the well site;  
2) Fugitive emissions are emissions of natural gas that escape 
unintentionally during the well construction and production 
stages; and  
3) Vented emissions result from natural gas that is collected and 
combusted onsite or vented directly to the atmosphere in a 
controlled way.162 
Fugitive methane emissions and direct CO2 emissions appear to be 
of greatest climate concern.163 While the Howarth et al. study remains 
the most high profile analysis on climate impacts of unconventional 
natural gas development,164 Cathles et al. have challenged the study,165 
arguing that “the greenhouse impact of natural gas is only as bad as 
coal if a very high methane leakage rate of 7.9% and a short global 
warming impact period of 20 years are selected.”166 With a smaller 
estimate of gas leakage rates and a hundred-year timeframe, natural 
gas appears to have a smaller global warming impact than coal.167 Due 
to the varying periods of time that carbon dioxide and methane impact 
climate change, it matters whether one considers a twenty-year versus 
hundred-year timeframe. In a twenty-year timeframe, the short-lived 
climate forcer methane will have a comparatively larger impact than 
over the hundred-year timeframe. Beyond this difference, it is fair to 
say that insufficient modeling has been conducted to date to truly 
understand the greenhouse gas footprint of cradle to grave 
unconventional natural gas development. 
 
162. Ruth Wood et al., Tyndall Centre Manchester, Shale Gas: A 
Provisional Assessment of Climate Change and Environmental 
Impacts 38 (2011). 
163. See Overview of Final Amendments to Air Regulations for the 
Oil and Natural Gas Industry, supra note 6, at 3 (hydraulic 
fracture flow-back brings up significant quantities of methane, VOCs, 
benzene, ethylbenzene, and n-hexane). 
164. For another study on air emissions, see Gabrielle Pétron et al., 
Hydrocarbon Emissions Characterization in the Colorado Front Range: 
A Pilot Study, 117 J. Geophysical Res. D04304 (2012). 
165. See Cathles et al., supra note 158, at 525 (arguing that the study’s analysis 
was seriously flawed for a variety of reasons); Nathan Hultman et al., The 
Greenhouse Impact of Unconventional Gas for Electricity Generation, 6 
Envtl. Res. Letters 044008 (2011), available at http://iopscience.iop 
.org/1748-9326/6/4/044008/pdf/1748-9326_6_4_044008.pdf (examining the 
use of global warming potential values in the Howarth paper). 
166. Cathles et al., supra note 158, at 528. 
167. Id. 
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Mark Fulton et al.168 explain that the EPA has until recently 
assumed natural gas has been captured but is now revising its 
calculations to consider the scale of methane emissions that have yet 
to be captured.169 They note that “[t]hese revisions have caused some 
to question whether replacing coal with natural gas would actually 
reduce GHGs, when emissions over the entire life cycles of both fuels 
are taken into account.”170 Addressing these questions requires an 
understanding of a number of factors for which there is currently 
insufficient information.171 Similarly, the Jiang et al. study focused 
only on “[h]ydraulic fracturing associated GHG emissions [that] result 
from the operation of the diesel compressor used to move and 
compress the fracturing fluid to high pressure, the emissions 
associated with the production of the hydraulic fracturing fluid, and 
from fugitive methane emissions as flowback water is captured.”172 
This does not consider the broader methane emissions from the entire 
natural gas system. Furthermore, most recent studies other than the 
Howarth study have used the IPCC hundred-year global warming 
potential rather than the twenty-year timeframe that Howarth used 
to account for the greater intensity and short lived nature of methane 
over carbon dioxide.173 
O’Sullivan and Paltsev estimate that the U.S. natural gas value 
chain emitted more than 3 percent of national fugitive methane and 
that “for the vast majority of contemporary shale gas wells, the 
 
168. Mark Fulton et al., Comparing Life-Cycle Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions from Natural Gas and Coal 28 (2011) (“Going from the 
100 year GWP [global warming potential] to the 20-year GWP of 72 
increases life-cycle emissions for natural gas by 31 percent and for coal by 
only 6 percent. At the GWP of 72, the power plant emissions for natural 
gas are 35 percent lower than those for coal. At the 105 GWP, the 
emissions for the gas-fired plant are 27 percent lower than those for coal.”). 
169. Id. at 7 (“The bulk of the EPA’s recent upward revisions of natural gas 
emissions estimates are related to the production part of the gas value 
chain. . . . The revisions also include an increase in the share of gas that 
is produced from hydraulically fractured shale gas wells and a change in 
the assumption as to how much of the flow-back emissions are flared. 
Previously, the EPA assumed that 100 percent of these emissions were 
flared or captured for sale. The new estimate assumes that 
approximately one third are flared and another third are captured 
through ‘reduced emission completions.’”). 
170. Id.  
171. Id. 
172. Mohan Jiang et al., Life Cycle Greenhouse Gas Emissions of Marcellus 
Shale Gas, 6 Envtl. Res. Letters 034014, at 5, available at http:// 
iopscience.iop.org/1748-9326/6/3/034014/pdf/1748-9326_6_3_034014.pdf. 
173. See id. at 2 (“We use the 100-year GWP factor, in which methane has a 
global warming potential (GWP) 25 times higher than carbon dioxide.” 
(citation omitted)).  
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revenues gained from using reduced emissions completions to capture 
the gas produced during a typical flowback cover the cost of executing 
such completions.”174 Rather than assuming that all emissions are 
vented, as they view Howarth’s calculations, or assuming that 93 
percent of potential fugitive emissions are captured by industry as 
ANGA did, O’Sullivan and Paltsev assume that “70% of potential 
fugitives are captured, 15% vented, and 15% flared.”175 
Skone et al. explain that determining relative coal–natural gas 
greenhouse gas intensities depends upon a range of uncertainties 
including natural gas use and emission during transmission, well 
completion, and the estimated well lifespan.176 It also matters whether 
 
174. Francis O’Sullivan & Sergey Paltsev, MIT Joint Program on 
the Sci. & Pol’y of Global Change, Shale Gas Production: 
Potential Versus Actual GHG Emissions 7 (2012); see also id. at 2 
(“The economic production of shale gas is only possible through the use of 
hydraulic fracturing to increase production rates from the extremely low-
permeability shale formations. The hydraulic fracturing process has two 
main stages: injection and flowback. During injection, a slurry made up of 
a carrier fluid, typically water, and a proppant agent, typically sand, is 
forced into the well at pressures significant enough to induce fractures in 
the reservoir rock. These propped fractures allow gas in the formation to 
flow from the well at economically acceptable rates. After the injection 
phase is completed, flowback takes place. Here some of the initially 
injected fluid returns to the surface over the course of a week or more. 
During flowback, the well also begins to produce gas. It is the amount of 
this gas, and how it is handled, that has been central to the debate about 
the GHG intensity of shale development.”). 
175. Id. at 6; see also id. at 7 (“If the cost of reduced emission completion is 
$1,000 per day as stated by Devon (2008), 95% of the 2010 Barnett 
wells yielded positive net revenues, i.e. operators added to the value of 
their wells by capturing the potential fugitive emissions. Even at twice 
this reported capture cost, $2,000 per day, 83% of the 2010 Barnett 
wells would still positive net revenues, and this trend is repeated in . . . 
all the other shale plays.”); Ramón A. Alvarez et al., Greater Focus 
Needed on Methane Leakage from Natural Gas Infrastructure, 109 
Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sci. 6435, at S7 (2012) (“The main difference is 
that Howarth et al. [2011] assume much greater methane emissions than 
we do. As described above, we estimate that 2.1% of natural gas 
produced is lost annually between the well and the power plant 
(including the local distribution system, we estimate that the natural 
gas emitted is 2.4% of gross natural gas production). Howarth et al. 
[2011] used a range of 3.6–7.9% for shale gas and 1.7–6.0% for 
conventional gas (as a percentage of the CH4 produced over the lifecycle 
of a well . . . .”). 
176. Timothy J. Skone et al., Nat’l. Energy Tech. Lab., Life Cycle 
Greenhouse Gas Inventory of Natural Gas Extraction, 
Delivery and Electricity Production 38 (2011). 
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electricity, home heating fuel, or some other use is specified as an end 
use.177 
While few members of the general public individually have 
expertise spanning the scientific, technical, legal, economic, and social 
ramifications of internalizing the cost of greenhouse gas emissions, the 
national academies are well positioned to provide credible new 
information with which to make collective and inclusive energy policy 
decisions across the complex array of energy sources. 
Conclusion: Dynamic Governance Recommendations 
Energy decision making need not be truncated into a chase-our-
tail discussion over the relative merits of two forms of fossil fuel 
(natural gas and coal), ignoring all other energy-climate-water 
considerations. The United States National Academies are well 
positioned to lead an expanded and intensified series of spotlight 
studies until we have a well-lit picture of unconventional natural gas 
production—before proceeding. I argue that the discussion should be 
broadened beyond a water pollution178 and coal comparison discussion 
to a solution-generation initiative that encompasses minimizing 
natural gas emissions, enhancing offshore renewable options such as 
wave power, and governance innovation, including linking cap and 
trade programs. 
 
177. See id. (“[A]verage coal, across a wide range of variability, and 
compared across different assumptions of climate impact timing, has 
lower greenhouse gas emissions than domestically produced natural gas 
when compared as a delivered energy feedstock—over 50 percent less 
than natural gas per unit of energy. However, the conclusion that coal is 
the cleaner fuel flips once the fuels are converted to electricity in power 
plants with different efficiencies—53 percent for natural gas versus 35 
percent for coal. Natural gas-fired electricity has a 42 percent to 53 
percent lower climate impact than coal-fired electricity. Even when fired 
on 100 percent unconventional natural gas, from tight sands, shale and 
coal beds, and compared on a 20-year GWP, natural gas-fired electricity 
has 39 percent lower greenhouse gases than coal. This shifting 
conclusion based on a change in the basis of comparison highlights the 
importance of specifying an end-use basis—not necessarily power 
production—when comparing different fuels.”). 
178. See Love Canal City Looks into Accepting Drilling Wastewater, EEnews 
Greenwire (Oct. 21, 2011), http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/rss/ 
2011/10/21/21 (“Niagara Falls, N.Y., is looking into accepting hydraulic 
fracturing wastewater to spur its limping economy. The Niagara Falls 
Water Board says it has the specialized wastewater treatment plant for 
the job and could use more business now that the chemical industry has 
declined. . . . Environmentalists, including Lois Gibbs, who led the charge 
against toxic contamination at Love Canal, are critical of sending more 
chemicals to the region. The Love Canal incident at Niagara Falls spurred 
the creation of the federal Superfund program.”). 
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I recommend enhancing disclosure requirements for the full range 
of data necessary to generate lifecycle analysis, including industry 
wide greenhouse gas emissions rates. This can be done at the stage of 
participating in the stock market, obtaining insurance, qualifying for 
public subsidies before receiving tax advantaged status, amendments 
to existing environmental statutes such as the Clean Air Act, or by 
EPA rulemaking—just to mention a few approaches. Given the 
international nature of the climate collective action problem, such 
legal requirements could be written into the climate instrument that 
countries have recently committed to ratifying by 2020.179 A Rip Van 
Winkle siesta until then is not advisable; there is a need for local 
momentum to continue to propel environmentally sound decisions 
into the constrained market place. Local impacts in the form of cancer 
spikes in given communities allow ordinary citizens to highlight the 
inequity of allowing large corporations to continue to externalize 
pollution costs. Neighboring communities care about both steady 
employment and averting terminal illnesses as a result of exposure to 
contaminants.  
At present, the federal government does not even know how much 
methane is being released on federal lands. Congressmen Markey and 
Holt argued in a letter to then–Interior Secretary Ken Salazar that 
scant fines do not deter drillers from minimizing unsafe operations. 
The congressmen urged Salazar to apply fines transparently, 
uniformly, and at a level capable of altering corporate incentives to 
internalize negative health and environmental externalities. The 
congressmen cited over fifty cases of oil and gas operators 
commencing operations prior to legal approval to drill. Furthermore,  
[t]here were 2,025 safety and drilling violations issued to 335 
companies in 17 states between February 1998 and February 
2011. One-fourth of the violations were deemed ‘major 
environmental or safety violations’ . . . [and] one-third of a 
random sample of wells chosen by Interior were 
hydraulically fractured near, in or below an underground 
 
179. See Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the 
Conference of the Parties, 17th Sess. at 2, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 (Dec. 11, 2011) (“The Conference of the 
Parties [to the UNFCCC] Decides that the Ad Hoc Working Group on 
the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action shall complete its work as 
early as possible but no later than 2015 in order to adopt this protocol, 
another legal instrument or agreed outcome with legal force at the 
twenty-first session of the Conference of the Parties and for it to come 
into effect and be implemented from 2020.”). 
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source of drinking water. The committee defined ‘near’ as 
within a quarter-mile of an aquifer.180 
Enhanced and integrated governance innovation and technical 
unconventional natural gas innovation can help incentivize best 
practices where unconventional natural gas extraction is sensible.  
Building on the change-agent role that the World Bank has 
provided in coordinating technological, legal, and industry initiatives 
to vent and then capture rather than flare natural gas, I argue that 
best practices can be shared and built upon to mitigate methane’s 
intense, short-term climate-forcing impact at a time when scientists 
indicate that we have surpassed the climate tipping point.  
This Article analyzes the climate mitigation momentum challenge 
in the face of uncertainty. It is not enough to say that there is 
insufficient data on natural gas development and greenhouse gas 
emissions. State and non-state coordination can gather the information 
with which to make informed decisions on energy policy. When the 
oversight role to internalize negative externalities (flaring, for example) 
atrophies for lack of incentive to balance environmental, health, and 
economic factors, then decision making should be expanded to levels 
where balancing is more likely to occur. In some contexts this may be 
where local health impacts are sufficiently concentrated to galvanize 
public-private coordination to solve pollution problems. At other times 
it may be deciding at a level that encompasses both the positive benefit 
of the natural extraction as well as including those negatively impacted 
by the production in decision making on such factors as flaring. 
Despite broad scientific consensus that climate change is 
occurring, solution generation has been hampered by the lack of 
comprehensive life-cycle analysis across energy options. This Article 
seeks to contribute to the understudied area of climate-energy policy 
with regard to natural gas development. Hydraulic fracturing has 
received a great deal of attention since 2008, largely with regard to 
water implications of natural gas development. Having analyzed this 
elsewhere, here I seek to build on this ongoing discussion with the key 
 
180. Phil Taylor, Fines for Violations Rare on Public Lands—Democratic 
Report, EEnews Greenwire (Feb. 9, 2012), http://www.eenews.net/ 
Greenwire/rss/2012/02/09/5; see also Noble Energy Brings Large-scale 
Fracking Plans to Nev., EEnews Energywire (Jan. 10, 2013), 
http://www.eenews.net/energywire/rss/2013/01/10/10 (“Noble Energy 
is awaiting approval for its proposed project, which could produce about 
50,000 gallons of oil per day by late 2014. . . . Noble Energy’s large-scale 
proposal could test regulators unaccustomed to dealing with projects of 
such scope.”); Complaint, Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bureau of 
Land Mgmt., No. 11-CV-6174 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2011) (several 
environmental groups filed a lawsuit challenging the federal 
government’s leasing of nearly 2,600 acres of federal land in California 
to oil and gas developers for natural gas development).  
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challenge of optimizing energy use and mitigating climate change. 
Ignoring the need for further empirical data and collective decision 
making should give way to coordinated information gathering and 
climate-energy solution generation. 
For green technologies to play a meaningful role in greenhouse gas 
mitigation, state and non-state actors at all levels need to cooperate to 
not only map cradle to grave (life cycle analysis) but also implement 
robust rather than minimal green technologies. Green technology inno-
vation (both governance and technical) can best be carried out through 
dynamic federalism, networked from local energy siting challenges to 
global economic, social, and environmental synergies.  
“Who decides” often becomes a legal question of preemption but 
arguably should involve capacity coordination. That is to say, the 
states retain powers not exerted by the federal government and not 
delegated to substate actors. A robust body of literature has examined 
environmental federalism. I seek to contribute a reconceptualization 
that broadens the frame of unconventional natural gas analysis to 
include international, regional (both supra and subnational), national, 
state, substate, tribal, and non-state actor impacts. Who can exert 
the power is only one way of looking at the challenge to address 
unconventional natural gas extraction. Who can best contribute what 
part of public private partnership coordination to my mind offers a 
break-out, solution-generating frame with which to bridge economic, 
social, and environmental synergies. What does this look like? Drilling 
down figuratively and literally has proved challenging in a vacuum of 
natural gas information. That said, it is fair to say that substrates 
vary not only from state to state, but from drilling site to drilling site. 
Local information can best be gathered through local participant 
observers in this hydraulic fracturing health, environmental, economic 
experiment that has ramped up since 2008. 
Climate impacts are global while other health and environmental 
impacts can be quite localized to well-drilling sites. This reality has 
fueled the confusion over what level of governance should take a lead role 
in deciding not only the scale of natural gas regulation but also whether 
to allow unconventional natural gas extraction in the first place. 
While a small town may not have the resources to regulate 
natural gas extraction (an argument being made for decision making 
to occur at the national or state level), a small town does not need to 
be rich to be able to decide to ban natural gas drilling.181 This is not 
just a capacity issue—it is a more nuanced issue of balancing energy, 
 
181. Cf. Gayathri Vaidyanathan, “We Look to the States’ to Implement 
Federal Rules, Scientists Say, EEnews (Jan. 30, 2013), http://www. 
eenews.net/energywire/rss/2013/01/30/7 (“ ‘I don’t see any way an 
Appalachian county can effectively regulate Marcellus development,’ 
said Paul Roberts, a resident of Maryland’s Garrett County who is part 
of the Maryland Governor’s Commission on Natural Gas Drilling.”). 
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social, and environmental cost and benefit sharing.  
In contrast, small towns have no greater ability to define diesel 
fuel than the EPA, given that it was left undefined by the Energy 
Policy Act of 2005. If the EPA defines diesel based on hydrocarbon 
molecules found in diesel, then other oils might be included in 
addition to diesel. While the Energy Policy Act of 2005 created a 
hydraulic fracturing carve out from Safe Drinking Water Act 
regulation, this exemption did not extend to diesel fuel use in 
hydraulic fracturing.182 Whether trying to define diesel or to balance 
intellectual property rights, health, and environmental exposure 
information, to my mind the patchwork of measures curbing 
unconventional natural gas is anemic.  
By coordinating citizen-monitoring groups with academic expertise 
and public sector environmental agencies, we can pool data, interpret 
findings, and facilitate life cycle analysis, energy access, efficiency, and 
climate mitigation. In the abstract these are all shared goals, but the 
squabbling intensifies as economic, social, and environmental trade-offs 
are made—particularly when done behind closed doors.  
In order to follow through on U.S. commitments under the 
framework climate convention, the United States should regulate all 
six principal greenhouse gas emissions, considering their relative 
lifespans and global warming potential. With regard to methane, 
strict regulations need to be enforced to prohibit flaring natural gas. 
Industry flaring, venting, and release of natural gas have substantial 
climate destabilizing consequences.183 Less clear are the rates of flaring 
and the projected leakage rates for natural gas production and 
transport. Yet, these numbers matter when trying to assess the 
relative impacts of natural gas vis-à-vis coal, oil, nuclear, and 
renewable cradle-to-grave impacts.  
This Article has considered how to move beyond an “either/or” 
federalism debate to a cooperative governance framework. Dynamic 
climate and natural gas governance can help gather information, 
identify climate-energy-water synergies and implement greenhouse gas 
emissions reductions. 
 
182. See EPA, Permitting Guidance for Oil and Gas Hydraulic 
Fracturing Activities Using Diesel Fuels: EPA Discussions 
with Stakeholders (2011) (including a list of possible diesel fuel 
definitions); Alan Kovski, Four Senators Urge EPA to Use Caution In 
Regulation of Some Hydraulic Fracturing, Bloomberg BNA (Dec. 22, 
2011), http://news.bna.com/deln/DELNWB/split_display.adp?fedfid=239 
04049&vname=dennotallissues&fn=23904049&jd=a0d0b1g6k4&split=0 
(noting the concern of an overly broad definition of diesel fuel). 
183. See Anna Driver & Bruce Nichols, Shale Oil Boom Sends Waste Gas 
Burn-Off Soaring, Reuters (July 25, 2011, 2:18 PM), http://www. 
reuters.com/article/2011/07/25/us-shale-flaring-idUSTRE76O4SU20110725 
(noting that flaring of natural gas substantially adds to global warming). 
  
 
   
